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THE OVERLOOKED UTILITY OF THE DEFENDANT CLASS
ACTION
FRANCIS X. SHENt
When and how can defendant class actions serve the goal of in-
creasing social welfare? Existing literature on class actions has over-
looked the utility of defendant class actions, and thus, has failed to an-
swer this question. This Article presents a general theory of defendant
class actions, and argues that three interrelated principles should guide
the use and evaluation of defendant class actions. (1) Forward looking
deterrence principle. The forward looking deterrence principle holds
that the utility of defendant class actions should be measured by its con-
tribution to future deterrence of harms by the proposed defendant class.
(2) Dynamic effects principle. The dynamic effects principle holds that
evaluation of a defendant class action should include all secondary ef-
fects such as feedbacks, price adjustments, new incentive structures, and
changing group dynamics. (3) Aggregate analysis principle. Taking the
dynamic effects principle one step further, the aggregate analysis princi-
ple holds that the evaluation of defendant class actions should ultimately
rest on an aggregate, society-wide cost-benefit analysis. In developing its
general theory, and synthesizing these three principles, this Article util-
izes a newly constructed database of 177 cases considering defendant
class action certification. This Article also spends significant time ana-
lyzing deficiencies in Hamdani and Klement's 2005 proposal for "the
class defense. " Three potential applications for defendant classes are
considered at various points in the paper: (1) illegal file sharing on the
Internet, (2) corporate fraud and illegal dealing, and (3) copyright in-
fringement. In each context, this Article argues that existing literature
and jurisprudence generally take a backwards looking approach, do not
properly account for dynamic effects, and too often ignore aggregate
analyses.
INTRODUCTION
You know what a class action lawsuit is. But what do you remem-
ber about defendant class actions from your civil procedure or torts
class? The answer, most likely, is nothing. That is because defendant
t I owe a special debt of gratitude to David Rosenberg, who provided advice, critique, and
feedback on this Article. Jack Goldsmith, Jed Sugarman, and fellow participants in the Harvard Law
School Summer Academic Fellows program also provided very useful feedback. Sophia Beal pro-
vided her constant support and excellent editing skills. I note that my work is done A.M.D.G.
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class actions are typically overlooked in both law school classes and le-
gal scholarship.' This Article argues that upon closer examination the
defendant class action can-in certain situations that may present them-
selves more frequently in coming years-serve the goal of maximizing
social welfare.
To date, academic analysis of class action litigation has focused al-
most exclusively on plaintiff class actions.2 Although there have been a
handful of articles and notes concerned with the defendant class, they do
not provide us with a comprehensive theory with which to understand
and evaluate defendant class actions. 3 Recent proposals for expanding
I. See infra Figure 1.
2. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 913, 914 n.2 (1998) ("A full bibliography of those publications devoted in whole or substantial
part to the use of class actions in litigation would warrant a sizable appendix. But a listing of books
and articles I have found helpful-some of which are long and detailed, while others, though short,
are incisive and provocative-may serve a dual purpose: to provide a brief, accessible bibliography
for those interested in further research and to furnish a single, easily consulted source of cross-
reference for later citations in this essay.").
3. See generally Theodore W. Anderson & Harry J. Roper, Limiting Relitigation by Defen-
dant Class Actions from Defendant's Viewpoint, 4 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 200 (1971)
(discussing the differences between plaintiff and defendant class actions under the then recently
adopted Rule 23); Debra Lyn Bassett, U.S. Class Actions Go Global: Transnational Class Actions
and Personal Jurisdiction, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 42-44 (2003) (discussing "the impact of the
participation of other countries' citizens in U.S.-based class action litigation," specifically in regard
to the issue of personal jurisdiction); Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Fairness to the Absent Members ofa
Defendant Class: A Proposed Revision of Rule 23, 1990 BYU L. REV. 909, 909-12 (1990) (discuss-
ing due process and general fairness concerns when Rule 32 is applied to defendant class actions);
Vince Morabito, Defendant Class Actions and the Right to Opt Out: Lessons for Canada from the
United States, 14 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 197, 197-202 (2004) ("[Olpt out regimes should not be
employed in defendant class proceedings as they create serious obstacles to the fulfillment of the
policy objectives of the class action device . . . and are not necessary to ensure that members of
defendant classes are treated fairly."); A. Peter Parsons & Kenneth W. Starr, Environmental Litiga-
tion and Defendant Class Actions: The Unrealized Viability of Rule 23, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 881, 908-
14 (1975) (arguing that the defendant class action can be used as "a constitutionally sound and
highly practical vehicle for environmental litigation" in certain situations); Samuel M. Shafner, The
Juridical Links Exception to the Typicality Requirement in Multiple Defendant Class Actions: The
Relationship Between Standing and Typicality, 58 B.U. L. REV. 492, 492-93 (1978) (discussing how
the standing doctrine and typicality requirement apply to class actions involving multiple defendants,
specifically regarding the potential problems arising from the juridical links exception to typicality);
Robert R. Simpson & Craig Lyle Perra, Defendant Class Actions, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1319, 1319
(2000) (exploring "the sparse law governing defendant class action lawsuits and its potential appli-
cability to the recent wave of litigation against the firearms industry"); Barry M. Wolfson, Defendant
Class Actions, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 459-61 (1977) (presenting defendant class action as a legiti-
mate, useful and under-utilized, tool in litigating certain issues); Angelo N. Ancheta, Comment,
Defendant Class Actions and Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 33 UCLA L. REV. 283, 283-89 (1985)
(arguing that "the defendant class action is a powerful, albeit uncommon, procedure for vindicating
constitutional and statutory civil rights"); Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 630,
632-33 (1978) [hereinafter The Harvard Note] (presenting an overview of defendant class actions
and discussing the potential due process and general fairness issues presented by this litigation
device); Irving A. Gordon, Comment, The Common Question Class Suit Under the Federal Rules
and in Illinois, 42 ILL. L. REV. 518, 528 (1948) ("[T]he defendant class suit presents both motive
and opportunity for improper practice."); Debra J. Gross, Comment, Mandatory Notice and Defen-
dant Class Actions: Resolving the Paradox of Identity Between Plaintiffs and Defendants, 40 EMORY
L.J. 611, 611-13 (1991) (proposing a revision to Rule 23 which would mandate notice to all defen-
dants in defendant class action suits); -Robert E. Holo, Comment, Defendant Class Actions: The
Failure of Rule 23 and a Proposed Solution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 223, 266-68 (1990) (arguing that
Rule 23 ought not to govern defendant class actions and proposing the adoption of a new rule spe-
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the use of defendant class action devices have focused primarily on is-
sues arising out of internet and mass communication markets, without
considering a more general application.4 For example, these recent pro-
posals have almost entirely missed the possibility of defendant class ac-
tions as a tool for improving responsible corporate decision-making.
In the standard treatment of class actions, commentators typically
set aside analysis of defendant class actions altogether with an explana-
tion such as, "today defendant class actions are rare and pose special
problems of representation and due process that are beyond the scope of
this paper."5 The standard approach is correct in observing that defendant
class actions are certainly more rare and, at present, more legally suspect
in the eyes of courts than plaintiff class actions. But by stopping there,
cifically designed for this type of suit); Leighton Lee III, Comment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23: Class Actions in Patent Infringement Litigation, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 50, 59-60 (1973) (noting
the problem of adequate representation of defendants in patent infringement defendant class actions);
Scott Douglas Miller, Note, Certification of Defendant Classes Under Rule 23(b)(2), 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1371, 1371 (1984) (discussing how to determine when certification of a defendant class is
appropriate and proposing a "test which minimizes heterogeneity by certifying only those classes
whose members share a legal relationship that predates the litigation-a juridical link"); Note, Stat-
utes of Limitations and Defendant Class Actions, 82 MICH. L. REV. 347, 347-50 (1983) ("[I]n de-
fendant class actions the statute of limitations should be tolled as to all named and absent class
members upon informal notice given by the plaintiff at the beginning of the suit."); Randy Clarke, A
Defendant Class Action Lawsuit: One Option for the Recording Industry in the Face of Threats to
Copyrights Posed by Internet Based File-sharing Systems (Spring 2001) (unpublished Honors
Scholar Seminar Paper, Chicago Kent College of Law),
http://www.kentlaw.edu/honorsscholars/2001students/writings/
clarke.html (exploring the use of defendant class actions to litigate cases of peer-to-peer file-sharing
copyright infringement).
4. See generally Nelson Rodrigues Netto, The Optimal Law Enforcement with Mandatory
Defendant Class Action, 33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 59, 59-60 (2007) ("The objective of this article is to
suggest an enhancement of law enforcement through mandatory aggregation of defendants and
improvement of the defendant class action to incentivize the class lawyer."); Nicole L. Johnson,
Comment, BlackBerry Users Unite! Expanding the Consumer Class Action to Include a Class De-
fense, 116 YALEL.J. 217, 217-18 (2006) ("This Comment takes the Hamdani and Klement proposal
["to allow certification of defense classes at the instigation of defendants"] a step further and sug-
gests that the class defense has a more expansive applicability, not only for achieving economies of
scale and overcoming collective action problems in litigation, but perhaps more importantly in
obtaining settlements.").
5. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 919. Shapiro also notes that, "As Stephen Yeazell has shown in
his informative history of the class action, defendant classes with a pre-existing coherence were
often litigants in the early stages of class action development . Id. Nagareda, too, tables the
question for another day:
Though the Supreme Court has yet to speak definitively to the matter, federal appellate
courts have proven relatively unreceptive to defendant classes under Rule 23(b)(2).
Whether that chilly reception stands as either a proper reading of Rule 23 or otherwise a
sensible conception of the class action is a question that I leave for another day.
Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 149, 181 n. 131 (2003) (citation omitted). Erichson makes the same move when he writes:
Defendant class actions are permitted by Rule 23(a), and are certified on rare occasion.
This paper, however, considers only plaintiff class actions, which are far more common
and offer a better foil for understanding mass non-class litigation. Although mass litiga-
tion sometimes involves hundreds of defendants, and defense lawyers often coordinate
their efforts through joint defense agreements, the mass collective representations that re-
semble class actions occur almost exclusively on the plaintiff side.
Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class
Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 531 n.37 (2003) (citations omitted).
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the standard mode of analysis gives us little insight into how we should
evaluate this present state of affairs.
Why do defendant class actions receive such little treatment? If they
are seen as theoretically untenable or unfair, then the theory needs to be
examined. If we ignore defendant class actions because they are fewer in
number than plaintiff class actions, the question to ask is whether they
should be used more often. If the argument is that they are not feasible in
practice, then system design issues come to the forefront. These issues-
theory, frequency, and feasibility-are related, but distinct from one an-
other. This Article will address each of them, focusing most of its atten-
tion on the fundamental principles that should motivate courts to certify
defendant classes. The goal of this Article is thus to lay out a general
theory of defendant class actions.
In developing its general theory, this Article argues that courts and
commentators have recognized the benefits of aggregation, but have
overlooked the informational advantages of the defendant class device.
Specifically, this Article argues that the class action device can serve an
auction-like function of producing information about defendants' relative
contributions to harm. In situations where the market is unlikely to pro-
duce such information, the value of defendant class actions is greater.
This Article delineates a series of real-world situations in which these
informational benefits can be gained through a defendant class action.
In developing its theory, this Article argues that three interrelated
principles should guide the use and evaluation of defendant class ac-
tions:6
(1) Forward looking deterrence principle. The forward-looking
deterrence principle holds that the utility of a defendant class action
should be measured by its contribution to future deterrence of harms by
the proposed defendant class.7 This principle stands in stark contrast to
an existing strand of jurisprudence that looks backwards and attempts to
determine pre-existing relationships (or "juridical links") between mem-
bers of the proposed defendant class.8
6. To be sure, similar principles can be, and have been, applied to traditional class actions as
well. See CHARLES FRIED & DAVID ROSENBERG, MAKING TORT LAW: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE
AND WHO SHOULD Do IT 37 (2003) (identifying optimal precautions, optimal insurance, and redis-
tribution of wealth as primary goals of the tort system).
7. As will be discussed subsequently, the premise is that individuals in the future, whether
potential defendants or potential plaintiffs, will adjust their behavior according to the court's actions.
Thus, the court is not constantly shifting, but rather making a clear statement about what individuals
can expect if they act in certain ways, e.g., they might expect to be included in a defendant class and
stuck with joint and several liability for the harm caused by their class. Courts can still be flexible in
administering the rule in different contexts as changes occur (social, technological, etc.). See infra
Part II.A.
8. See generally Shafner, supra note 3; Miller, supra note 3.
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(2) Dynamic effects principle. The dynamic effects principle holds
that our evaluation of defendant class actions should include all secon-
dary effects such as information generation, feedbacks, price adjust-
ments, new incentive structures, and changing group dynamics. This
includes the standard law and economics approach to examine incentive
structures, but "effects" here are broadly defined to also include group
dynamics related to psychological mechanisms. This principle stands in
opposition to the position that the court should focus solely on the imme-
diate effects for the named plaintiff and defendants.
(3) Aggregate analysis principle. Taking the dynamic effects prin-
ciple one step further, the aggregate analysis principle holds that our
evaluation of defendant class actions should ultimately rest on an aggre-
gate, society-wide cost-benefit analysis. In situations where deterrence of
harm simultaneously involves deterrence of a good, the aggregate analy-
sis principle instructs the legal analyst to consider multiple cross-cutting
effects at high levels of aggregation.
With these three background principles laying the foundation, the
Article makes a series of more specific arguments. Drawing on an analy-
sis of 177 cases where defendant class actions were contemplated, the
Article argues that courts have failed to see that plaintiff and defendant
class actions should not be distinguished on conceptual grounds, but
rather on the different group dynamics that are likely to exist in defen-
dant, as opposed to plaintiff, classes. Specifically, the incentives for in-
tra-class information sharing between plaintiff and defendant class mem-
bers is likely to be quite different without the class device in place.
In developing its general theory, this Article analyzes Hamdani and
Klement's proposal for "the class defense," a device that would allow
defendants to class themselves with others similarly situated.9 This Arti-
cle argues that although Hamdani and Klement's analysis is more thor-
ough than previous work on defendant class actions, it still fails to go far
enough toward a general theory. The paper also examines Netto's recent
argument for the use of defendant class actions in the case of illegal
downloading. Netto provides a defense of aggregation, but like Hamdani
and Klement, fails to recognize the informational benefits likely to arise
out of some even small defendant classes.
In addition to a general discussion, two potential applications for
defendant classes are considered at various points in the paper: (1) deter-
ring illegal file sharing on the Internet, and (2) deterring corporate fraud
and illegal dealing. In both contexts, this Article argues that existing lit-
erature and jurisprudence generally take a backwards-looking approach,
do not properly account for dynamic effects, and too often ignore aggre-
gate analysis. This Article argues that failure to follow these principles
9. Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 687 (2005).
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makes it less likely that the existing solutions will achieve optimal deter-
rence. This Article also considers the hard case of copyright infringe-
ment, which challenges the feasibility of defendant class actions in cases
where no group of defendants is readily identifiable as the group to lead
the class defense.
This Article is organized into four sections. The first section of the
paper reviews existing literature on defendant class actions. The second
section develops a general theory, drawing in part on the psychology
literature on group decision making. The third section then presents a
system design based on the general theory, focusing in particular on the
application of these systems to the case of illegal dealings by corporate
executives, illegal file sharing on the Internet, and copyright infringe-
ment. The fourth section concludes with thoughts for future research
directions in this area.
I. EXISTING LITERATURE
The existing literature on defendant class actions is comprised of a
few journal articles, several Notes, and a handful of additional publica-
tions.' 0 Much of the literature on defendant class actions has considered
how Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule 23" or "the Rule") can
be applied to defendant class actions." For example, Scott Douglas
Miller, author of Certification of Defendant Classes Under Rule
23(B)(2), discusses the "dispute over Rule 23's terminology" and pro-
vides an analysis of the text of the Rule.12 Likewise, Randy Clarke
moves through the language of the Rule in evaluating a potential defen-
dant class action against music downloaders.' 3 In his commentary on
defendant class actions, Robert Holo also proceeds with a formalist
analysis, considering how the language of the Rule applies: "Despite
Doss, it is clear that (b)(2) certification of defendant classes is always
inappropriate because of the express language of the rule. Courts should
not ignore the clear language of the rule in order to better serve their per-
ceptions of justice or fairness."' 4 This Article does not focus on formalist
10. See sources cited supra note 3.
I1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Interpretation of Rule 23 has been a challenge for courts and academ-
ics alike because it is open to varying readings. As Judge Posner noted, "The question whether there
can be a defendant class in a Rule 23(b)(2) suit cannot be answered by reference to authority."
Henson v. E. Lincoln Twp., 814 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1987). Because of this potential latitude,
federal appeals courts have moved to reign in the class mechanism. The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit has written that a rule to the contrary would "enable any action, with the possibility
that it might be one of multiple actions, to be certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B)." Namoff v.
Merrill Lynch, 829 F.2d 1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1987).
12. The language in 23(b)(2) is his concern: "Few actions for equitable relief are based on
plaintiffs' conduct; rather, plaintiffs initiate such suits in response to defendants' conduct." Miller,
supra note 3, at 1375. Miller's analysis of court cases proceeds to consider how they look at the
language of the Rule. "Thus, all federal courts that have considered defendant class certification
under Rule 23(b)(2) have done little more than superficially reviewed the rule's terms." Id at 1376.
13. Clarke, supra note 3.
14. Holo, supra note 3, at 264.
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concerns such as the best interpretation of the language of Rule 23.
Rather, this Article adopts a functionalist framework and theorizes about
when defendant class actions will best serve the goals of maximizing
social welfare.
Although articles by Netto (2007), Johnson (2006), and Hamdani
and Klement (2005) have begun to address more functionalist concerns
in the past few years, the literature remains limited.15 My review of the
literature argues that scholars have generally concentrated too much on
proceduralist concerns (i.e., scrutiny of the language of Rule 23), and
have failed to provide a thorough functionalist analysis. My purpose in
reviewing this literature is to identify some of the most discussed market
and incentive dynamics associated with defendant class actions. Once
these dynamics are recognized, Section II of the paper develops a general
theory to incorporate them.
A. All Defendant Classes are Not the Same
Defendant class actions originate out of the same legal history and
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as plaintiff class actions.1 6 Like plaintiff
class actions, defendant class actions became more feasible after the
1966 amendments to Rule 23.17 Although defendant class actions are less
frequent than plaintiff class actions, "[t]he use of a defendant class action
is not a recent development."' 8
15. The literature also remains disconnected from previous studies. The literature, for in-
stance, has yet to be synthesized in a single article. Even the more recent articles have not cited all
previous works. In Hamdani & Klement's analysis of defendant classes, they fail to cite several
works on defendant class actions, including a short piece from three years earlier that had considered
defendant class actions in the similar context of file sharing. The uncited work was Clarke, supra
note 3.
16. See generally Netto, supra note 4, at 76-87 (providing a history of the defendant class
action, and its development in the United States).
17. Howard Downs notes that "[w]hereas original Rule 23 restricted binding class actions to
cases involving 'joint or common rights' or actions affecting 'specific property,' amended Rule 23
relaxed these restrictions, which extended the social and economic uses of the class device." Howard
M. Downs, Federal Class Actions: Due Process by Adequacy ofRepresentation (Identity ofClaims)
and the Impact of General Telephone v. Falcon, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 607, 608 (1993). "Although it
appears that the modem-day class action was born probably some time during the Middle Ages,
there are reports of ecclesiastical proceedings against numerous insects and animals dating as early
as A.D. 824." Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 946-47 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
"These early 'defendant class actions' date from a very early period: in A.D. 824, against moles in
Aosta; in A.D. 864, bees in Worms; in A.D. 886 locusts of Romagna; and in the same century,
serpents of Aux-les-Bains." Id. at 947.
18. Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
2010] 79
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Notes: Graph notes the number of hits for "class action" vs. "defendant class"
action cases in LexisNexis database of all state and federal cases. The number
of hits does not represent the actual number of certified plaintiff or defendant
classes.
Nonetheless, the explosion of class action litigation has been over-
whelmingly on the plaintiff side. To gain some historical perspective, I
conducted a LexisNexis search of all Federal and State cases from 1960-
2007 using the phrase "class action" or "plaintiff class." I then ran the
search again with the terms "defendant class action" or "defendant
class." These searches, while not providing an accurate count of the ac-
tual number of cases contemplating class actions, nevertheless serve as a
proxy for the popularity of the class device in the courts. The number of
hits per year, presented graphically in Figure 1, gives us a sense of the
disparity between defendant and plaintiff class actions. While discussion
of class actions generally has risen steadily since 1966-growing very
significantly in the last decade-contemplation of defendant class actions
has remained quite low throughout the forty years. While this class ac-
tion term search produced over 1,000 hits starting in the 1970s, over
Figure 1. Number of "class action" and "defendant class" men-









2000 starting in the late 1990s, and over 4,000 in the most recent years,
defendant class mentions have never risen over 100 hits. The number of
plaintiff class actions clearly dwarfs the number of defendant class ac-
tions.
One straightforward reason for such little use of the defendant class
device is current jurisprudence on Rule 23. Defendant class actions are
governed by Rule 23, and thus, as a preliminary matter courts look for
satisfaction of the four Rule 23(a) prerequisites: numerosity, commonal-
ity, typicality and adequacy of representation.19 Analysis of these prereq-
uisites explains much of the infrequency of defendant class actions, but
tells us little about whether that infrequency is a useful (functional) out-
come. I am not concerned with re-interpretation of Rule 23, but rather, I
am primarily concerned with evaluating the outcome of its current inter-
pretation, i.e., evaluating whether the defendant class action should be
expanded on the grounds of improving social utility. For reasons to be
discussed subsequently, I argue that in fact there should be such an ex-
pansion of defendant class action use.
Before moving to that argument, let us review the prerequisites that
prevent many instances of efficient and socially desirable class certifica-
tion. Courts currently do not depart radically from accepted views of
Rule 23 jurisprudence. A recent 2003 decision from the District of New
Jersey provides a concise summary of the state of the law:
There is a significant split of opinion as to whether Rule 23(b)(2)
ever permits injunctive relief against a defendant class. The Fourth
and Seventh Circuits, together with the leading treatise on federal
procedure, take the view that defendant classes are not authorized by
Rule 23(b)(2). These authorities are generally of the view that the
text of 23(b)(2) itself forbids defendant classes....
On the other hand, the Second Circuit, together with the leading
class action treatise, take the view that defendant classes are permit-
ted by Rule 23(b)(2). The Sixth Circuit appears to agree that defen-
dant classes are permissible under Rule 23(b), but only if individual
defendants are all acting to enforce a locally administered state stat-
ute or uniform administrative policy. The principal justification for
permitting defendant classes under Rule 23(b)(2) seems to be that the
device can be particularly useful to bind to a court decree a group of
defendants who, out of recalcitrance or neglect, have refused to con-
form their conduct to settled substantive law or to eliminate the need
for ancillary proceedings against a number of semi-autonomous de-
fendants once the court has made a basic determination of legal is-
sues applicable to all. 20
19. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
20. Clark v. McDonald's Corp., 213 F.R.D. 198, 217. (D.N.J. 2003) (citations omitted).
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Ultimately, the court concluded that:
A review of the foregoing district court decisions reveals that the cer-
tification of 23(b)(2) defendant classes has been implemented only
tepidly in the Third Circuit, and has met success, if at all, only in
cases where the individual defendants of the class are alleged to be
acting in conformity with an illegal state statute, rule, or regulation.2 1
Commentary from other courts similarly note that "defendant
classes seldom are certified," and if they are certified, "such certification
most commonly occurs[:] (1) in patent infringement cases; (2) in suits
against local public officials challenging the validity of state laws; or (3)
in securities litigation."22
To gain a broader perspective on defendant class actions, I exam-
ined cases in which a defendant class action was contemplated. 23 Utiliz-
ing the LexisNexis database of all federal and state cases, as well as pre-
vious academic and court citations, I identified 177 cases in which a de-
fendant class was contemplated.24 These cases, listed in the online ap-
pendix, were coded for subject. Table 1 provides a summary of the sub-
ject matter.
The analysis of these cases is consistent with the courts' observa-
tions that defendant class actions have been used frequently for securities
cases and for constitutional challenges. These two categories alone ac-
count for fifty three percent of the defendant class action cases. There
are, however, more extensive uses of class actions than typically ac-
21. Id. at 220. In this particular case, plaintiffs sought to certify as a class all McDonald's
under Title Ill of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court did not certify a defendant class
because "the individual members of the defendant class have been non-uniform in their non-
compliance with such policies." Id. The court speculated that:
Had plaintiffs alleged, for example, that McDonald's and its franchisees adhered to a
company-wide policy of providing just one handicapped parking space in restaurant park-
ing lots, or of installing no "grab bars" in restaurant toilet stalls, then one could imagine
why injunctive relief-against the defendants as a class-might be appropriate to redress
such violations.
Id. at 220-21.
22. Thillens, Inc. v. Cmty. Currency Exch. Ass'n of Ill., Inc., 97 F.R.D. 668, 674 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (citations omitted). Thillens went on to read:
Several rules, useful in unilateral as well as bilateral defendant class actions, emerge from
In re Gap and similar cases: (1) A defendant class will not be certified unless each named
plaintiff has a colorable claim against each defendant class member; (2) A defendant
class will not be certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) without a clear showing that
common questions do in fact predominate over individual issues; (3) The requirement
that each named plaintiff must have a claim against each defendant may be waived where
the defendant members are related by a conspiracy or "juridical link."
Id. at 675-76. Netto notes that the defendant class action device "is more frequent in lawsuits involv-
ing civil rights, disputes challenging constitutionality of state and local law and practices enforced
by public officials, and suits against unincorporated associations, e.g., labor unions. Defendants'
classes have also been certified in other contexts, such as patent infringement, antitrust, securities,
and environmental law." Netto, supra note 4, at 87.
23. Defendant classes sometimes emerge out of counter-claims in plaintiff class actions. I
have excluded them from this analysis, as they are not the focus of the paper.
24. The search was conducted in February 2008.
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knowledged. While declaratory judgments on property rights and bene-
fits are similar to the constitutional challenge and security cases, ten per-
cent of the cases concerned damages.
Table 1. Summary of selected cases in which defendant class ac-
tion was proposed
Case Subject Matter Number Pct.
Constitutional Challenge 63 35.6%
Securities 31 17.5%
Damages 18 10.2%
Property Rights 17 9.8%
Benefits - Insurance or Retirement 14 7.9%
Monopoly / Anti-Trust 7 4.0%






NOTES: Defendant classes were not certified in all cases. The 177 cases
coded here were identified through searches in the LexisNexis database of All
Federal and State cases. See text for details of search procedures.
Both academics and judges have paid close attention to the nature of
the potential defendant class. Over twenty-five years ago, The Harvard
Note recognized the functional nature of many defendant class actions:
"The structure of certain types of defendant class actions virtually guar-
antees adequate representation. Suits against the members of a labor un-
ion or other unincorporated association, naming the officers as represen-
tative of the class, provide one example."2 5
When the relationship between defendants is clearly demarcated,
the courts see fewer barriers to certifying defendant classes. Analyzing
when courts are likely to certify defendant classes, Miller finds that
"[c]orrectional institutions, county magistrates, county sheriffs, local
prosecutors, and voting officials have all been certified and bound as
defendant classes." 26 Courts have developed the juridical links exception
25. The Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 642.
26. Miller, supra note 3, at 1379.
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to understand connections between defendant members of the class.
Courts have defined a juridical link "as 'some [independent] legal rela-
tionship which relates all defendants in a way such that single resolution
of the dispute is preferred to a multiplicity of similar actions."'27 Exam-
ples of such links include partnerships or joint enterprises, conspiracy,
and aiding and abetting. These terms denote some form of relationship or
activity on the part of the members of the proposed defendant class "that
warrants imposition of joint liability against the group even though the
plaintiff may have dealt primarily with a single member." 28
In a similar vein, Holo sees defendant class actions as more likely
when the defendants are connected through some superior authority.29
Holo provides examples of courts certifying defendant classes in securi-
ties fraud cases, and suits against groups of state/local officials. 30 It is
important to note here that in these cases, the courts look backwards to
see if a relationship existed between the potential defendant class mem-
bers prior to the allegations. When a juridical link already exists, courts
are willing to see the group dynamics. But they do not see how they
could actually create such links in the future via their judgments in the
present case; there is no forward looking jurisprudence.
The courts' analyses in these cases bear some resemblance to the
search for a conspiracy or coordinated action. In a 1990 opinion, Federal
District Judge D. Brock Homby recognized this connection in a footnote,
in which he quotes Holo and states that:
27. Follete v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492, 507 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (alteration in original) (quoting
Thillens, 97 F.R.D. at 676).
28. Id. at 508 (quoting Akerman v. Oryx Commc'ns, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 363, 375 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)). In his Note, Miller stated: "The test suggested by this Note minimizes the dangers inherent in
class heterogeneity by certifying only those defendant classes whose members share a relationship
predating the litigation, and whose role in the litigation derives from their membership in the preex-
isting group. Courts have characterized such classes as 'juridically linked."' Miller, supra note 3, at
1394-95. "When the defendant class is juridically linked these courts miss the mark. In such cases
individual relief is subordinate to class relief. Traditional party relationships should be far less sig-
nificant than the general nature of the interclass dispute." Id. at 1400-01. Courts do not always agree
on whether sufficient juridical links exist. In Funliner ofAlabama, L.L.C. v. Pickard, the Alabama
Supreme Court focused on a lack of written agreement as determinative:
In In Re Activision Securities . . . the Court found that the defendants, who were all un-
derwriters and members in a securities syndicate, had entered into a written agree-
ment .... We do not find the facts of Activision analogous to those of the instant case.
There has been no finding that the defendants in this case entered into a written agree-
ment or that they agreed to be bound to a common course of conduct; the trial court did
not even note that the plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy among the defendants. Thus, the ju-
ridical-link exception found in Activision is missing here.
873 So. 2d 198, 215-16 (Ala. 2003).
29. Holo, supra note 3, at 239 ("All the defendants are bound together because of their com-
mon obligation to adhere to a particular state law or policy.").
30. "For example, modem securities fraud litigation often involves a plaintiff class of inves-
tors suing a defendant class of securities underwriters." Id at 227. Holo also notes the usefulness of
defendant class action in the context of state/local officials who are illegally discriminating. "By
binding all members of a defendant class to a single judgment, widespread discriminatory practices
can be brought to a halt more quickly and efficiently." Id. at 228.
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I leave to the plaintiffs determination of how properly to join the
dealers as named defendants. I recognize the complexities in joining
a large number of defendants or, as suggested at oral argument, creat-
ing a defendant class. Commentators have wondered: "Can the exis-
tence of a conspiracy be proven in a single proceeding representing
the entire defendant class, or does proof of a conspiracy depend upon
proving each defendant's participation in the alleged conspiracy, an
inherently individual question that must be answered separately for
each defendant?"31
One additional rule courts have introduced in analyzing the relation-
ship of potential members of a defendant class is a membership ratifica-
tion theory. 32 "Under [the membership ratification] theory dealing with
individual proof of illegal conduct becomes unnecessary. Rather, a pre-
sumption arises that all members of the association joined in the alleged
conspiracy." 33 It is essentially a 'guilty by association with the Associa-
tion' rule. Functionally, this is telling individual defendants that they
should have asked questions up front and should have monitored their
association, or otherwise contracted ex ante to avoid this liability.3 4 Like
the juridical links rule, however, the membership ratification rule looks
back to earlier relationships between potential class members. But even
though the courts are backwards-looking here, we can see in their juris-
prudence the roots for more functionally effective legal rules. For in-
stance, laying down a 'guilt by association with the Association' rule
would likely have a strong future deterrent effect on the behavior of indi-
viduals in that Association.
B. Financial Incentives & Free Riding
The most frequently noted motivational problem with defendant
class actions is the lack of adequate incentive for defendant class repre-
sentatives to fully litigate. This basic insight was offered over two dec-
ades ago:
Defendants generally oppose motions to certify them as class repre-
sentatives. The major reason for their opposition presumably is a de-
sire to avoid a possible increase in litigation expenses if they repre-
sent a class, in light of the fact that no source of funds is available to
pay for any additional costs. 35
31. In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp., 307 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 n.7 (D. Me. 2004) (quot-
ing Holo, supra note 3, at 258).
32. Holo, supra note 3, at 259.
33. Id.
34. See Phelps Dodge Ref. Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 139 F.2d 393, 396-97 (2d Cir.
1943).
35. The Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 648.
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This point has been reiterated since then in most discussions of de-
fendant class actions. 3 6 As discussed by Hamdani and Klement, when the
defendant class wins, "the defendants owe nothing to the plaintiff-no
money changes hands." 37 Thus, there is no money to pay counsel for the
class representative because no single member of the defendant class has
the proper financial incentives to litigate the defense fully.38
The incentive problem is connected to a free-rider problem: defen-
dant class members who are not litigating stand to benefit without cost
from a successful class defense. 3 9 Unlike plaintiff classes, where litiga-
tion costs can be subtracted out of a settlement, it is more difficult to
extract money from passive defendants in the class. 4 0 Analysts have been
41grappling with this problem-and how to correct it-for many years.
Dwelling on the comment that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
"devise a method to tax such 'free riders,"' the 1978 The Harvard Note
observes that:
[A]ssuming that all the class members or collateral estoppel benefici-
aries could be identified, there would still be problems of determin-
ing how much to charge each individual. Only the common issues
will have been litigated if the defendant class prevails, and the court
will therefore have no knowledge of the magnitude of total liability
avoided or of the proportion attributable to each class member....
36. See, e.g., Netto, supra note 4, at 92 ("There are three foremost concerns related to the
choice of adequate representation in defendant class actions: (i) the choice of the representative is
made by the plaintiff; (ii) the absence of incentive for any defendant to bear the expenses of defend-
ing a lawsuit on behalf of the entire class when the costs of litigation are disproportionate to the
representative party's stake; and (iii) the difficulty of compensating class counsel for the benefits
conferred upon the class."); see also Brandt, supra note 3, at 919-20 ("In comparison, a defendant
class representative will seldom be able to take advantage of the same fee incentives as a plaintiff
representative.... Consequently, the defendant representative must be prepared to assume some, if
not all, of the economic burden of the litigation.").
37. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 9, at 691.
38. An important exception, discussed infra Part IIB. 1, is when there are "dominant players"
in the class.
39. See The Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 648 ("[Tlhere might seem to be a certain unfair-
ness to the defendant class representative even if his defense of the class entails no extra costs; if the
common question is resolved in favor of the defendant class, absentee members will have received a
benefit at the representative's expense without having to compensate him for it."); see also Miller,
supra note 3, at 1385 ("Further, party heterogeneity increases the legal fees and administrative costs
associated with coordinating a defense. The defendant class representative cannot expect to recoup
these additional costs . . . .").
40. The ability to correct for the free-rider problem, as discussed in Part II.D, depends heav-
ily on the nature of the group dynamics within the defendant class.
41. See The Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 652-53 (The Note argues for expanded use of
what it terms "expanded common question defendant class action." They suggest that courts frame
the question "not in terms of what each individual class member owes but rather in terms of what
formula should be used to allocate the total liability." Unfortunately, after this interesting discussion,
the Note suggests that, "[o]f course, in any of these 'fully litigated' defendant class actions a final
stage of individualized hearings is needed-whether conducted along with the class suit or entirely
separately from it.").
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[T]he class members would need to be taxed according to their po-
42tential liability, a figure difficult if not impossible to determine.
Aware of the incentive problems with defendant class actions, some
courts have refused to certify defendant classes on the grounds that the
parties representing the class do not have the proper incentives to litigate
fully. 43 This issue of free riding and funding optimal defendant class rep-
resentation is a topic I take up at length in the system design section of
this Article.
C. Funding Defendant Class Actions
Recognizing the free-rider problem, several funding schemes have
been proposed. Some of these proposals involve a tax-like levy on de-
fendant class members. To fund the defendant class action, the court
could choose "to tax the expenses attributable to the class action to the
plaintiff, to tax them to the absentee defendants, or to refuse to certify the
class on any questions not perfectly common to the class members."44
This proposed solution is to tax the absentees "with a proportionate share
of at least the class-action-related expenses of the named defendant."45
A common alternative is to find some organization with deep pock-
ets and make them a party as well. 4 6 Plaintiffs bringing the suit are typi-
cally in a position to identify the deep pocket class members on the other
side. In the securities case Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis v.
Fox & Co.,4 7 the plaintiffs sued the class of Fox partners in addition to
Fox itself "in order to assure recovery of the substantial judgment likely
to issue if plaintiffs succeed in proving their claims." 48 Courts have rec-
ognized that financial stakes will motivate defendants to mount adequate
defenses. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park,49 the court
held that "[b]y including as [defendant] class representatives the 10 high-
est tax collectors from Conrail . . . the district judge created a fair group
42. Id. at 648-49 & n.96.
43. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n for Mental Health, Inc. v. Califano, 717 F.2d 1451, 1458 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (The defendant university, U.S.C., said explicitly in testimony that "it was 'unwilling to ex-
pend the effort and funds necessary to defend itself in this action, let alone represent the interests of
a large group.' . . . The school's position was supported by the affidavit of one of its administrators,
who stated: 'Due to the minimal amount of its alleged liability in this action, the University of
Southern California does not intend to defend this action on behalf of itself or any others."').
44. The Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 656.
45. Id. at 657.
46. See, e.g., Holo, supra note 3, at 271 (Holo's solution is for the judge to bring in some
defendant with the money: "Nevertheless, the judge may, in her discretion, assign additional defen-
dants to act as corepresentatives, thus lessening the financial burden on any one defendant and at the
same time preventing any defendant from shirking his duties."); see also The Harvard Note, supra
note 3, at 656 (arguing that adequate representation (aligning incentives) might be accomplished in
some instances by requiring "the plaintiff to name as an additional defendant a trade organization
whose membership coincided with that of the class").
47. 102 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
48. Id. at 510.
49. 47 F.3d 473 (2d Cir. 1995).
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of representative parties who presumably have the greatest financial mo-
tivation to defeat Conrail's case."50 Where plaintiffs do not already in-
clude deep pocket defendants, the court can also find the necessary par-
ties. Holo suggests that, "a court can require a plaintiff to join additional
defendants as class representatives and can also permit associations or
other institutional representatives to join as representative defendants."
In other words, the court can look to kick a private market into motion to
52fund the class defense. In In re Integra Realty Resources, Inc., the
Tenth Circuit did just this, naming Fidelity as the defendant class repre-
sentative against Integra because the Fidelity Capital Appreciation Fund
was the largest Integra shareholder when Integra spun off (thus bringing
on the litigation).
D. Aggregation, Opt-Out, and Deterrence
The benefits of aggregating claims in order to enjoy economies of
scale is discussed at several points in previously published literature.
Netto writes that amongst courts and academics today, "[i]t is a general
consensus that the primary advantage of class actions is to override the
transactional cost of low stake claims, which would not be individually
prosecuted because the costs of litigation . . . supersede the expected
utility from the adjudication." 54 The primary point, as noted by Holo, is
that aggregation "allows the defendants to pool their resources, decide
who among them would be the most fit representative, and present a
strong, united front against their opponents." 5 The spirit of these com-
ments, in favor of aggregation, is the same spirit animating David
Rosenberg's arguments in Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants
Have and Plaintiffs Don 't.5 6 In Rosenberg's analysis of plaintiff class
actions he recognizes that defendants are able to enjoy the benefits of
scale in defending themselves, while plaintiffs-unless they have a class
device-cannot. 57 Here, in the case of defendant class actions, plaintiffs
start with pooled resources that defendants do not have. The defendant
class action serves as a tool to address this imbalance.
The majority of analyses on defendant class actions have argued for
an opt-out option based on fairness and due process concerns.8 But the
50. Id. at 484.
51. Holo, supra note 3, at 234.
52. 262 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2001), affd, 354 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004).
53. See id at 1096.
54. Netto, supra note 4, at 98; see also Hamdani & Klement, supra note 9, at 711-13.
55. Holo, supra note 3, at 268.
56. David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't,
37 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 393, 394-97, 399-402 (2000).
57. See id. at 393-94, 400-02, 407-08, 412.
58. See, e.g., Brandt, supra note 3, at 911-13; see also Netto, supra note 4, at 98 ("In fact,
some circumstances will actually create incentives not to opt out of a defendant class. For example, a
plaintiff who commences a defendant class against a group of underwriters of a new stock offering
may also threaten and be able to commence litigation against each of the underwriters individually.
Given the certainty of having to make a choice between remaining in a defendant class or defending
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cost of opt-out (and unraveling the defendant class) is significant. Simp-
son and Perra explain the rationale for not allowing opt out:
[O]rdinarily no one wants to be a defendant, so that defendant class
members who have an opportunity to opt out can be expected to do
so . . . . Massive opt-out undermines the breadth and finality of
judgments, increases the possibility of duplicative litigation, and
lessens the probability of giving plaintiffs full relief.59
The empirical data on how the opt-out option is used in practice is
lacking. As observed by Morabito, "there is little information available
concerning the percentage of class members who have opted out of de-
fendant class proceedings, after being offered the opportunity to do so
following the certification of defendant classes."60 Morabito found only
three U.S. cases in which opt-out rates were discernible: "3 defendants
opted out of a class of 91; no one exited another defendant class; and in a
third proceeding, 115 defendants opted out."61
The deterrence objectives of class action litigation have also been
raised several times in the existing literature. 62 In the deterrence view,
"the primary purpose of class litigation is not so much to redress injured
plaintiffs as to deter wrongful conduct on the defendant's part by forcing
him to disgorge his unlawful gains or by restructuring his behavior
through the use of injunctions."63 Hamdani and Klement have focused
extensively on deterrence, and their proposal will be discussed more in
depth in the next few sections.
individual litigation, the economics of a joint defense considerably outweighs those of defending an
individual action, and defendant class members would have an incentive to remain in the class.").
59. Simpson & Perra, supra note 3, at 1334 (alteration in original); see also Holo, supra note
3, at 266 (considering proposal of a no-opt-out rule before moving away from the suggestion). Al-
though Holo doesn't stick with it, he actually considers proposing a no-opt-out rule as well:
One more possible modification would be to eliminate the 23(c)(2) opt-out provision for
proposed members of a defendant class. Some courts have worried that any defendant
named in a 23(b)(3) defendant class action would promptly opt out, thus rendering the
class action device useless, but this modification would successfully resolve that prob-
lem.
Id. In the next line, he moves away from this suggestion, but the logic was there. Id. ("In the final
analysis, however, these measures also would be inadequate.").
60. Morabito, supra note 3, at 226 (footnotes omitted).
61. Id.
62. See Simpson & Perra, supra note 3, at 1319 (suggesting the possibility of using defendant
class actions to solve the problem of holding the firearms market liable). As they ask at the outset:
[H]ow can municipalities and other "representative organizations" summon each alleg-
edly culpable firearms industry player to the table? How can these suits be structured to
ensure that each participant in the manufacturing, advertising and distribution channels is
held accountable for its tortious behavior? How can a plaintiff, who has suffered damages
potentially caused by 191 different firearms manufacturers, hundreds of wholesalers and
over 80,000 retailers nationwide, join these potential defendants in a manner that ensures
that each suffers its proportional share of damages caused?
Id. Simpson & Perra structure their article, however, around the language of Rule 23, demonstrating
how the four requirements can be met-not discussing why it would be a good thing to have defen-
dant class actions. Id. at 1324-29.
63. The Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 654.
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E. Formalist and Proceduralist Concerns
While there are strains of functionalist thinking throughout the lit-
erature on defendant class actions, the bulk of the literature still grounds
itself in proceduralist concerns. Although some of these authors ac-
knowledge deterrence objectives, they fall back on a position articulated
by Miller, that the "usual incentive for defendant class certification rather
'64 -*is not economic utility but social justice.' This focus on social justice is
accompanied by a focus on due process and fairness.
In the context of defendant class actions, the concerns of commenta-
tors and courts are often those of due process. 5 The court in Thillens,
Inc. v. Community Currency Exchange Association of Illinois, Inc.66
noted, "Fundamental fairness to absentee members must be balanced
against judicial savings. Where representative adjudication occurs pursu-
ant to a defendant class, due process concerns not inherent in plaintiff
class actions arise. The crux of the distinction is: the unnamed plaintiff
stands to gain while the unnamed defendant stands to lose." 67 The court
in Gaffney v. Shell Oil Co. 68 arrived at the same point, arguing that "[i]n
the final analysis, the propriety of a class action-plaintiff, defendant or
both-depends upon a finding that due process will be accorded the
members of the class who are not before the court." 69 This Article argues
in the next Part that courts' analysis of gain and loss should include not
only unnamed parties, but also future potential parties with deterrence in
mind.
Exceptions, such as the juridical links exception just discussed, are
used by courts to address due process concerns. 70 Fairness, usually to
64. Miller, supra note 3, at 1387 (footnote omitted).
65. See In re the Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 291 (N.D. Cal. 1978) ("[Parsons and
Starr have] reviewed the use of defendant class actions in environmental litigation and . . . carefully
explored the due process problems posed by defendant class adjudications" and have observed, "The
basic constitutional dilemma of defendant class actions arises out of the due process rights of absent
members of the defendant class. Fundamental to due process is the notion that the authoritative
determination of a personal liability, obligation or right of a defendant requires the court's in per-
sonam jurisdiction over that party.") (quoting Parsons & Starr, supra note 3, at 888); see also Netto,
supra note 4, at 105-06 ("[M]andatory class actions aggregating damages claims implicate the due
process principle . . . [and] deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in
court.") (quoting Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). See generally Downs, supra note 17, at 627-30 (discussing due process in class actions).
66. 97 F.R.D. 668 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
67. Id. at 674 (citation omitted).
68. 312 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
69. Id. at 991.
70. Scott Douglas Miller states:
A defendant class member would consent to representative adjudication only if he per-
ceived, or might reasonably be expected to perceive, that the savings resulting from an-
other party's representation would exceed any liabilities-monetary or otherwise-
resulting from the representation. An absent defendant would only prefer representative
action where he perceived himself as adequately represented. The perceived probability
of loss would then be no greater in representative than in individual adjudication, but
there would be a net savings of litigation costs. Only if the defendant class is juridically
linked would absent members be so confident.
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absentee defendants, is another way of discussing due process.71 These
fairness concerns are rooted in the belief that we should treat class ac-
tions in the same way we would treat one-to-one litigation. Bassett ar-
gues that:
[T]here is no reason to believe that a court has the power to issue a
binding judgment upon a defendant-even if that defendant is part of
a defendant class-where that defendant has no nexus to the forum
and her purported consent to suit is based on her failure to opt out of
the class. Accordingly, there is no reason to treat members of a de-
fendant class any differently than a defendant in a non-class law-
suit . . . .72
Due process issues can be summarized in what one court has labeled the
'Rubik Cube' puzzle: "[E]ach plaintiff does not have a cause of action
against each defendant."73 When faced with this situation, courts may be
hesitant to certify the defendant class because they look backwards for
pre-existing connections.74 I argue that this view, articulated in different
forms by most courts, fails to recognize the intra-group dynamics that a
class device introduces. I therefore argue that in cases where there are
sizeable enough informational and incentive benefits to be gained from
classing a group of defendants, there is every reason to treat members of
the class differently-although collectively the same-than we would
treat them if they were a stand-alone defendant.
Miller, supra note 3, at 1399. Brandt, trying to reconcile defendant class actions with due process
concerns, proposes a complicated measure:
In order to protect the due process rights of absent defendant class members, Rule 23
should be revised in two respects. First Rule 23 should ensure that absent defendants will
not be bound by a class judgment unless they receive actual notice of the pendency of the
action. This protection should be extended so that it applies not only to actions under
23(b)(3) but also to defendant class actions maintained under 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2).
Brandt, supra note 3, at 944-45.
71. The Harvard Note, for instance, introduces the subject by arguing that defendant class
actions should not be "purchased at the expense of fundamental unfairness to persons who are not
before the court that binds them." The Harvard Note, supra note 3, at 632.
72. Bassett, supra note 3, at 76. Bassett continues that this means "that minimum contacts
with the forum state would be necessary in order to bind the defendant class member to the judg-
ment, and if minimum contacts were not established, the class judgment would be unenforceable
with respect to that defendant." Id.
73. Doss v. Long, 93 F.R.D. 112, 119 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The Rubik Cube problem can be
considered "in terms of standing, typicality, or commonality," but underlying it is concern with due
process. Id. at 120. The Thillens court noted the same thing: "There is great judicial reluctance to
certify a defendant class when the action is brought by a plaintif class. The primary concern with
bilateral actions, antitrust or other types, is a fear that each plaintiff member has not been injured by
each defendant member." Thillens, Inc. v. Cmty. Currency Exch. Ass'n of Ill., Inc., 97 F.R.D. 668,
675 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
74. In LaMar v. H.B. Novelty & Loan Co. in 1973, the Ninth Circuit considered the issue:
[W]hether a plaintiff having a cause of action against a single defendant can institute a
class action against the single defendant and an unrelated group of defendants who have
engaged in conduct closely similar to that of the single defendant on behalf of all those
injured by all the defendants sought to be included in the defendant class.
489 F.2d 461, 462 (9th Cir. 1973).
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II. DEVELOPING A GENERAL THEORY OF DEFENDANT CLASS ACTIONS
With the groundwork now laid, the Article picks up on its three cen-
tral principles, and develops a general theory of defendant class actions.
A. Forward Looking Deterrence
To build a general theory of defendant class actions, a preliminary
question about the purpose of tort law must be addressed. This Article,
like Netto (2007), adopts the initial position taken by Fried and Rosen-
berg, that "tort liability should be seen as part of the imperfect and partial
system serving the goals of compensation and deterrence."7 This ap-
proach follows a line of scholarship that focuses on maximization of
76social welfare as the goal of law generally, and of tort law specifically.
In the context of mass torts and collectivized adjudication, the Article
follows Rosenberg's (2002) premise that when government and first-
party insurance are not adequate, a "need exists for 'optimal tort deter-
rence' to prevent unreasonable risk of accident and for 'optimal tort in-
surance' to cover residual reasonable risk."n This position has not gone
uncontested; scholars such as Richard Epstein and Richard Nagareda
78have criticized this approach in exchanges with Rosenberg and others.
The Fried and Rosenberg approach rests on an appreciation of the
ex ante perspective.7 9 The ex ante perspective is one which seeks to un-
75. FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 2. The authors discuss these three functions at
length in Chapter 3, and justify them in Chapter 2. In addition to deterrence, Fried and Rosenberg
identify "optimal insurance, and related appropriate redistribution of wealth" as goals of the tort
system. Id. at 37. I consider redistribution and insurance issues in Part IlIl.A.I.
76. See generally David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option For
Mass Tort Cases, I15 HARV. L. REV. 831 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg 2002]. Rosenberg relies on
several works for "theories of deterrence, insurance, law enforcement, rational choice analysis, and
welfare economics." Id. at 831 n.1; see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998);
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shav-
ell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001).
77. Rosenberg 2002, supra note 76, at 832.
78. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical
Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 J.L. & COM. 1, 2-5, 49-50 (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Class
Actions: Aggregation, Amplification, and Distortion, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 475 (2003) [hereinafter
Epstein, Class Actions]; Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort
Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2002). In criticizing Rosenberg's position, Epstein argues
that:
Even if we reject (as current law manifestly does) the view that ex post compensation is
irrelevant, powerful implications still flow for the governance of class action litigation.
This position presupposes that the judgment should be collective and not individual, such
that a person who objected to the strategies pursued by the class would be required to re-
main a class member on the ground that the economies of scale in running the class ac-
tion would leave him better off than before. There is obviously a powerful paternalistic
streak in this argument.
Epstein, Class Actions, supra note 78, at 494. Because the larger debate has been carried out else-
where, this article will not review it in detail here.
79. Aside from this paragraph's brief discussion, this Article does not elaborate on the details
of the Fried & Rosenberg framework. Those details can be found in Chapter 2 of their book. FRIED
& ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 13-36.
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derstand an individual's preferences "under conditions of uncertainty, at
a point in time before the person knows which of possible alternative
fates will come to pass."80 In this ex ante state, "each individual internal-
izes all possible fates of all possible people."8' Because the individual
internalizes all possible states of the world, the individual rationally de-
sires a legal system that maximizes welfare in all possible situations the
individual may find himself. In a 2002 article, Rosenberg emphasized the
importance of the ex ante perspective as central to the argument for man-
datory class action for mass torts:
Essentially, this argument addresses the fundamental disjuncture be-
tween an individual's preferences ex ante-that is, before knowing
whether one will suffer tortious injury, and if so, how strong the re-
lated claim will be-and ex post-after learning the "luck of the
draw." Understanding how individual preferences change over time,
particularly as individuals acquire knowledge, is central to the argu-
ment for mandatory mass tort class action.82
In the context of defendant class actions, the starting point for an ex
ante approach is recognizing that ex ante, an individual does not know
whether he/she will be on the plaintiff or defendant side, or whether
he/she will be part of a large firm or in a large class of individuals. Thus,
in the ex ante world, a rational, social-utility maximizing individual
would have no reason to favor either 'plaintiff or 'defendant' classes. In
the context of music downloading, for example, an individual does not
know if they will be an RIAA employee, a musician, a downloader of
copyrighted music, a non-downloading user of the Internet, or some
other individual that might be affected by a class action against those
who download copyrighted music. In the context of corporate fraud, an
individual does not know if they will be on the corporate board, working
in the corporation's mailroom, holding stock in the corporation, or pur-
chasing services produced by the firm. In the context of mass copyright
violation (e.g., hundreds of thousands of pirated DVDs being sold across
the globe), one does not know where in the supply chain they will be
located.
Hamdani and Klement's analysis fails to consider this ex ante posi-
tion. As a result, Hamdani and Klement's core thesis does not plant its
roots as deeply as it could. Hamdani and Klement's "core thesis is that
the fundamental justification for consolidating plaintiff claims applies
with equal force to defendants."8 Their fundamental justification is, "[i]n
the plaintiff case, the cost of bringing a suit might dissuade victims from
suing wrongdoers . . . [and this] failure to litigate undermines justice and
80. Id. at 14.
81. Id. at 15.
82. Rosenberg 2002, supra note 76, at 831.
83. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 9, at 689.
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deterrence." 84 This fundamental justification, however, is not adequate.
Justice and deterrence may be undermined if plaintiffs cannot bring their
case, but it may also be that something other than a plaintiff class action
will generate optimal deterrence for similarly-situated defendants. We
need a more general theory to understand in what contexts the defendant
class action is likely to be effective for achieving optimal deterrence.
The lack of a general theory is evident in Hamdani and Klement's
choice to ground their analysis in the "standard justification for class
actions. The authors implicitly acknowledge their choice of the stan-
dard justification in a footnote. Citing the work of Rosenberg, they note,
"The standard justification for class actions focuses on claims for insig-
nificant amounts that would not be filed individually. However, that class
actions are desirable even for larger claims as long as the common de-
fendants enjoy economies of scale . . . .86 Beyond this citation, however,
the authors do not discuss the Rosenberg position and why even large
claim class actions may be desirable.
Nicole Johnson's recent extension of the Hamdani and Klement ar-
gument also fails to adequately consider fundamental principles. Johnson
"takes the Hamdani and Klement proposal a step further and suggests
that the class defense has a more expansive applicability, not only for
achieving economies of scale and overcoming collective action problems
in litigation, but perhaps more importantly in obtaining settlements."
The new settlement possibilities produced by aggregation of claims are
important, but we need more general discussion of when such possibili-
ties are likely to occur, and thus, when courts should look toward defen-
dant class certification.
Nelson Netto has advanced the defendant class argument on the ba-
sis of Rosenberg and Fried's theory of collectivizing claims. Netto ar-
gues that "the optimal economy of scale for investment in litigation re-
quires the compulsory reunion of the defendants and their defenses."88
Similar in spirit to Netto's argument, I start from the ex ante perspective
and build a series of propositions about what defendant class actions
should seek to do.
84. Id. at 689-90.
85. Id. at 689 n.14.
86. Id. The authors cite David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only
Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARM. L. REV. 831 (2002).
87. Johnson, supra note 4, at 218. Additionally, Johnson notes:
In the recently settled suit between NTP and RIM, a consumer class defense would have
allowed consumers, including large corporate firms that rely on BlackBerry devices for
critical communication, to protect their interests and take action in their own defense.
BlackBerry users might have obtained an earlier settlement or might have been assured
that they could reach a settlement regardless of a standoff between the parties.
Id. at 224.
88. Netto, supra note 4, at 98.
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In light of great uncertainty in the ex ante world, what can we say
about individual preferences for design of a legal system? First, we can
say that an individual will desire to maximize his utility "across all pos-
sible states of the world."89 Since an individual could end up either as
defendant or plaintiff, this leads to the corollary that in the context of
class actions, the individual will seek to maximize utility by maximizing
total utility of defendant and plaintiff In the case of traditional plaintiff
class actions, this means that we are not only concerned with the reduc-
tion in harm to the plaintiff class, but also the cost of reducing harm as
paid by the defendant. In the case of defendant class actions, the same
logic is applicable; we should consider not only the harm/risk-reduction
to the plaintiff, but also the cost of precautions to the defendant class.90
Second, we can say that defendant class actions should be consid-
ered in light of their future deterrent effect. I label this "forward looking"
in order to distinguish it from jurisprudence and commentary that looks
"backward" at pre-existing links between potential defendant class mem-
bers. My position can also be seen, however, as going "all the way back"
to the ex ante position. Regardless of which conception one uses-
forward looking or a return to the ex ante world-the important point for
defendant class actions is that we are not concerned primarily with exist-
ing or previous relationships between individuals/firms, but rather with
the likely future relationships between similarly situated individu-
als/firms that will result from a particular legal ruling.91
A corollary of this second point is that courts should ask the follow-
ing question: Will classing this group of individuals/firms be more effec-
tive for optimal deterrence than would the alternatives of individual pro-
ceedings or joining under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure? If the answer is "yes," then the court should certify the defendant
class. If the answer is "no," then the court should deny certification.
By posing the question this way, the analysis invites a comparison
to joinder. Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure says that de-
fendants can be joined if "any right to relief is asserted against them
jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences;
and any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action." 92 Courts look to the number of defendants to determine whether
89. FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 17 (emphasis added).
90. In principle, this bears some resemblance to Learned Hand's famous negligence calculus:
finding someone negligent when B < PL, where B = the "burden of precautions," P is the "probabil-
ity of harm" and L is the "gravity of harm." Both formulas emphasize a type of cost-benefit analysis.
91. Current or previous relationships between individuals and firms would be important to the
extent that they help us predict what would happen in the future. But, they should not be, in and of
themselves, the standard for evaluating a defendant class.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)-(B).
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joinder is impracticable.93 Presently, if the number of defendants is
greater than forty, then joinder will generally be presumed to be imprac-
ticable.94 Courts often look to class devices as an alternative if joinder is
not possible.9 5 As the U.S. District Court reasoned in Flying Tiger Line,
Inc. v. Central States,96 "[b]efore the Court takes the drastic step of certi-
fying a defendant class; however, the joinder alternative should be inves-
tigated more thoroughly." 97 While courts have made the focus of their
joinder analysis the number of defendants, I argue in the next section that
we should compare the two options on the basis not only of numerosity,
but also on the basis of more general group dynamics.9 8
My proposed approach also makes clear that the defendant class ac-
tion is not necessarily-as seems to be suggested by Hamdani and Kle-
ment-a device to go after the "little guy." 99 In deciding whether or not
to class the corporate executives of a failed financial firm, for instance,
the approach advocated in this Article might well lead to the conclusion
that they too should be classed. The reason would not be that they are too
numerous or incapable of being joined under other rules, but rather that
treating them as a class would better deter similarly-positioned execu-
tives in the future. If the executives know they will sink or swim as a
class, then they have greater incentive to internally check up on one an-
other. This would create a mechanism of self-governance that should
improve deterrence. Forward-looking deterrence is not concerned with
parceling out causation within the group. Critics might argue at this point
that such an approach will fail to make the proper causal connections
between harm-causing parties' actions and sanctions. To see why this
will not be the case, we need to consider the second guiding principle,
which is dynamic effects.
93. See Monaco v. Stone, 187 F.R.D. 50,64 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
94. Id. at 66 ("[A] class of more than forty members raises a presumption that joinder is
impracticable.").
95. Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 220, 226 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing FED R. Civ. P. 23(a)).
96. No. 86-304 CMW, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17409 (D. Del. Nov. 20, 1986).
97. Id. at *16.
98. This distinguishes my analysis from Netto, who writes that "[t]he defendant class action,
certified on behalf of the defendant requirement, is superior to mandatory joinder, because manda-
tory joinder is impractical when the number of defendants is extent and a defendant class action does
not need any drastic modification of actual statutes." Netto, supra note 4, at 105 n.186 (citing Char-
les Silver, Comparing Class Action and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 495 (1991) and Edward
Hsieh, Note, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect Method for Improving Patent Quality, 77 S. CAL. L.
REv. 683 (2004)).
99. While not explicit on this point, the tone of Hamdani & Klement's article is that small,
dispersed defendants need a device to help them fight a potentially over-bearing plaintiff. The lan-
guage of their article is not neutral in this respect. For instance, in building what seems to the specter
of groups like the RIAA, the authors write that "[m]ost alarmingly, plaintiffs can act strategically to
exacerbate the problem confronting each defendant, further diminishing the incentives to go to trial."




The principle of dynamic effects holds that we should consider all
likely effects of the court's legal ruling. In the context of defendant class
actions, this means that we should pay particularly close attention to the
group dynamics that would operate if a court decided to class a group of
defendant individuals/firms. One of the most important, but overlooked,
dynamic effects of the class device is the creation of a new market for
information generation. Drawing on the work of Michael Abramowicz,
who has reviewed and made the normative case for integrating market
mechanisms into legal proceedings, this section focuses on how incentive
structures change when individuals are made members of a class. 100
1. Group Dynamics
In determining whether it is marginally beneficial to class a group
of individuals/firms as a defendant class, we have to know what the
"baseline" group dynamics are; i.e., if the court did nothing to class the
defendants, how would they likely act in the face of individual lawsuits?
Up to this point in the Article, the proposed theory has laid out only simi-
larities between plaintiff and defendant class actions. This is consistent
with the argument that at a conceptual level, there is little to distinguish
plaintiff and defendant classes. In contrast to the conceptual and theoreti-
cal similarities, however, at the level of group dynamics, defendant and
plaintiff class actions have markedly different baselines. Specifically, I
argue that individual plaintiffs are (without any judicial intervention) less
likely than individual defendants to establish a "market relationship"
with others in their group.
I define "market relationship" as broadly as possible. I take market
relationship to mean any sort of relationship in which individuals/firms
act (or react) either directly or indirectly in response to actions (or reac-
tions) by other individuals/firms. This concept of market relationship
considers not only traditional market elements such as collective action
and price adjustments, but also social psychological elements such as
herd mentality and the fundamental attribution error (where we fail to
recognize the effects of situation in determining human behavior). It also
emphasizes the ability of the market to produce information, and most
importantly, information on relative contributions to harm by defendants
or relative harm experienced by plaintiffs.
Defendant class actions have been promoted in the past few years as
a solution to dispersed defendants each generating a small amount of
damage through new technological means. Netto argues, for instance, in
favor of mandatory defendant class actions as a response to mass produc-
100. See generally Michael Abramowicz, The Law-and-Markets Movement, 49 AM. U. L. REV.
327, 408-30 (1999).
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tion and a "technologically savvy society with the propensity for massive
unlawful behavior."' 0 While defendant class actions may be useful in
this context, it is important not to view the defendant class device nar-
rowly as only a response to technological innovation. A defendant class
may be useful more generally as an auction-like mechanism to produce
information about relative contributions to harm.
Auction mechanisms are already used in a variety of legal con-
texts.102 Auctions and exchange can serve important informational pur-
poses. For instance, if plaintiffs are allowed to sell their claims to bid-
ders, "[tihe price at which such shares trade in the secondary market pro-
vides an indication of the plaintiffs expected recovery at trial and thus
may dampen parties' abilities to puff in pretrial settlement bargaining."10 3
In the context of patent buy-outs, Michael Kremer has proposed that an
auction be used to determine the value of the patent.' 04 Applying similar
reasoning to defendant class actions, the class action device may be use-
ful as a means of generating information about relative harms. 1os That
information can then be used for settlement purposes.
To illustrate how this information production might play out, con-
sider a simple case in which two firms, A and B, are both defendants in a
case where negligence has caused 100 units of damage. The plaintiff firm
knows that it experienced damage of 100, but it does not know that Firm
A caused thirty percent of the damage and Firm B is responsible for sev-
enty percent of the damage. To see how collectivization can be useful
even with just two firms as defendants, examine the pay-off matrices
with and without the defendant class device that are presented in Table 2.
Without knowing relative contributions to harm, and without joint
and several liability, Firm B will have an incentive in the settlement
stage to settle for fifty percent of the damage because Firm B knows that
if it goes to trial, it will be shown liable for seventy percent of the harm.
Firm A, however, faces a different incentive structure. Firm A would
rather litigate than settle for 50 because litigation will lead to liability for
only 30 units of the harm. If Firm A and Firm B are treated separately,
then the plaintiff (who we assume here knows nothing of the actual rela-
tive contributions) will likely settle with Firm B and proceed to litigate
101. Netto, supra note 4, at 59.
102. See generally Abramowicz, supra note 100, at 335-52. Over twenty years ago, Marc
Shukaitis proposed a market for personal injury tort claims. Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal
Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 329-30 (1987).
103. Abramowicz, supra note 100, at 359-60.
104. Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 1137, 1146-47 (1998).
105. The informational benefits of defendant class actions were recognized by the Ohio Su-
preme Court in 1990, which noted that "[a] class suit may be especially useful in a case where puta-
tive class members refuse to identify themselves or deliberately act to avoid being controlled in




with Firm A. The non-class result, shaded in gray in Table 2, is thus a
transfer of 80 from the two firms to plaintiff.
Now consider what happens if the two firms are considered a single
class, held jointly and severally liable for the damage. Knowing that they
face a total payout of 100 if they litigate or settle, the choice will be to
settle. But now in the settlement stage, Firm A has an incentive to make
clear its contribution to harm, either through proceedings against Firm B
(more likely) or through negotiations with Firm B. Whichever route is
taken, information will be generated about relative contributions to harm;
information that would not have been generated in the world without
class certification.
Table 2. Pay Off Matrices With and Without Defendant Class Ac-
tion
NO CLASS ACTION
Firm A (3 0 %)
Litigates Settles
Firm B Litigates -30, -70 -50, -70
(70%) Settles -30, -50 -50, -50
WITH DEFENDANT CLASS ACTION
Defendant Class: A + B (100%)
Litigates Settles
-100 -100
The 2 x 2 matrix is admittedly greatly over-simplified, but it sug-
gests a general point that incentives amongst the defendants change when
they are held liable as a class, and not just as individuals. For a group of
N defendants, the N defendants in the class have an incentive to work out
their proportional liability to the plaintiff. Of course, enforcement re-
mains a challenge, and I will address that challenge in Part III of the pa-
per on system design.
I should emphasize that my suggested approach does not always
lead to defendant class action certification. Rather, it looks for the mar-
ginal value that the class device potentially offers. In cases where all
defendants are jointly and severally liable, the class device will not sig-
nificantly change the incentive structure already in place. A defendant
class device may also not be useful if all defendants are already bound
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through a single party. For instance, in Gaunt v. Brown,'06 the U.S. Dis-
trict Court correctly concluded that since the case was being brought
against the Attorney General, there was not a need to certify a class of
local boards of elections (in a case challenging the age requirement for
elections). 07 In this case, since the entirety of the defendant class was
bound by law to follow the Ohio Attorney General's directives, the mar-
ginal value of the class device was zero. os
2. Comparing Defendant and Plaintiff Group Dynamics
I now consider a broader set of possible plaintiff and defendant dy-
namics. As a basis for discussion, Table 3 considers the possible combi-
nations that might occur in a world where there are four types of groups:
(1) single firms/individuals, (2) a single dominant firm/individual, (3) an
intermediate number of firms/individuals, and (4) a large number of
firms/individuals. I assume that each group could find themselves either
on the plaintiff (harm bearing) or defendant (harm causing) side. This
generates 16 scenarios to consider. I sketch out what I believe would be
the "baseline" result; the likely result if there was no judicial certification
of a class on either side. I then offer my suggested "class outcome." In
other words, what would likely happen if the court decided to certify a
defendant class, a plaintiff class, or both?
The table reinforces that our focus should be on the difference be-
tween the baseline and class outcome columns. This is the marginal
value added by class certification. I have arranged the table so that every
other row flips the defendant and plaintiff sides. To make the table easier
to read, and to isolate the differences between defendant and plaintiff
class actions, I have highlighted the rows where defendant class actions
would be a possibility.
106. 341 F. Supp. 187 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
107. Id. at 1193. The court argued:
We agree that if plaintiffs prevail this would be an appropriate case to designate as a
plaintiff class action. However, we are not persuaded that it should be designated as a de-
fendant class action if plaintiffs prevail, inasmuch as the Secretary of State of the State of
Ohio is a party-defendant, and his duties are to advise members of local boards of elec-
tions as to proper methods of conducting elections. Also, the Secretary of State has the
further duty to "compel the observance by election of officers in the several counties of
the requirements of the election laws." Since the Secretary has the duty and power over
all the members whom plaintiffs would have us include in a defendant class action, the
need for a defendant class action is not apparent.




Table 3. Comparison of baseline and predicted
class-outcomes for selected configurations of plain-
tiff and defendant groups
No. PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT BASELINE CLASS
SIDE SIDE OUTCOME
Who is suffer- Who is caus- With no judi- What changes
ing the ing the cial class certi- if the court
harm/damage harm/damage fication, what classes defen-
? ? do we expect dants, plain-
to see? tiffs, or both?
I Single firm / Single firm / Traditional tort Optimal deter-
individual individual outcome: single rence achieved





2 Single firm / Dominant firm, Case against the Optimal deter-
individual controlling dominant firm, rence achieved
>50% market dominant firm at baseline;




3 Dominant firm, Single firm / Dominant firm Optimal deter-
controlling individual will prosecute rence achieved
>50% market fully, defendant at baseline;
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6 Single firm / Large number





7 Large number Single firm /





8 Dominant firm, Dominant firm,
controlling controlling
>50% market >50% market
share share






























































































10 Intermediate Dominant firm,
number of controlling
firms, control- >50% market
ling <50% share
market share
11 Dominant firm, Large number
controlling of firms / indi-




12 Large number Dominant firm,
of firms / indi- controlling
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13 Intermediate Intermediate Indeterminate. Class action
number of number of Both sides may certification, on
firms, control- firns, control- face collective either side, will
ling <50% ling <50% action prob- promote opti-
market share market share lems, but both mal deterrence
have a chance if collective
to overcome action prob-
them. lems are seri-
ous.
14 Intermediate Large number Large number of Certification of
number of of firms / indi- defendants both defendant
firms, control- viduals, each makes it more and plaintiff
ling <50% controlling difficult for classes may
market share very small plaintiffs to lead to optimalovercome collec- lead t opia
market share tive action prob- deterrence
lems
15 Large number Intermediate Plaintiffs are Certification of
of firms / indi- number of not likely to plaintiff class
viduals, each firms, control- overcome col- would promote
controlling ling <50% lective action optimal deter-
very small market share problems rence; Defen-
market share dants may need
class certifica-
tion as well
16 Large number Large number Neither side Certification of
of firms / indi- of firms / indi- will be able to both classes is
viduals, each viduals, each overcome col- required to
controlling controlling lective action obtain optimal
very small very small problems deterrence
market share market share
NOTES: a. See Rosenberg (2000), supra note 32. b. See Hamdani & Klement
(2005), supra note 6.
Perhaps the most interesting (and contentious) action in Table 3 oc-
curs when we compare rows 4-5 and rows 9-10. In each case, we are
flipping the "intermediate" number of firms from the defendant to the
plaintiff side. The crux of my argument is that it is more likely for this
mid-size group to overcome collective action problems when they are on
the defendant side. The reason for this logic is straightforward; on the
defendant side, parties do not have to initiate the proceedings. In fact, if
the plaintiffs name them all as defendants in a suit, they have had much
of the informational work of identification done for them. To the extent
that this happens, defendants already take concerted actions when sued
by a plaintiff. The court's class certification would be functionally re-
dundant, and the marginal value of class certification would be minimal.
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Defendant class actions are likely to have more value when defen-
dants are less capable of somehow binding themselves together. This
failure is most likely to happen in two scenarios: (1) when identification
and monitoring is not possible or practical, or (2) when enforcement of
group "rules" is not possible or practical. Both challenges open the door
for significant free riding. In Section III, on system design, I consider
both of these issues and possible legal remedies to correct for them.
3. A Closer Look at What Binds Individuals in a Potential Defen-
dant Class
Another way to think about the difference between plaintiff and de-
fendant class actions is to see that in the plaintiff class action case, the
individual plaintiffs are passive harm-takers. In the defendant class ac-
tion cases, the individual defendants are active harm-makers. This dis-
tinction leads to important differences between plaintiff and defendant
classes in terms of the ex ante market relationships that may develop.
Three types of relationships are likely to exist between individual defen-
dants: (1) they are all conducting market transactions with a single (or
small set of closely related) firms; (2) they are all legally bound in a gov-
ernment organization; (3) they are all voluntarily bound in an organiza-
tion of their own making. In the first case, adjustments can be made via
price levels. In the second and third cases, contracting can be worked out
through the governing organizations. It is only when none of these rela-
tionships exist that we see a need for defendant class actions.
What distinguishes the harm caused by small defendants, as op-
posed to the harm caused by large firm defendants, is the indirect nature
of the small defendants' action. In almost every case where defendant
class actions seem apt, there is a "market" intermediary. For instance, in
the context of securities fraud, the defendant security underwriters were
not hired by individual plaintiffs, but were working through some firm.
In the context of other corporate fraud, middle managers and others in
the firm who acted wrongly were all bound via contract to the same em-
ployer. In the context of state/local officials, they are causing harm by
virtue of their role within the state government/legal system. In the con-
text of music downloading, individuals are working with the help of sev-
eral intermediaries: their Internet Service Provider, their software maker,
etc.
To make this argument clearer, consider these two contrasting hy-
potheticals. First, consider a standard plaintiff class action in which a
firm has a poorly constructed factory, which sits on the corner of a busy
intersection. Everyday bricks fall off the building and cause damage to
passing cars. Because the damage is always minor, the cars never stop,
and no potential plaintiff ever brings a case. A plaintiff class action
would be necessary here because there is likely no ex ante market rela-
tionship between those who have been harmed. They were each harmed
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directly by the firm, with no intermediary; the brick fell directly on their
car.
Now consider a second hypothetical. A big firm has an old factory
that they no longer use. The factory, however, has bricks that are very
valuable if taken and re-sold. Imagine that individuals go up to this fac-
tory and remove one brick at a time. No single person takes more than
one brick. Setting aside, for now, the question of what precautions the
firm could take to stop this, let's consider the relationship between these
individual brick-stealers. It could be that each brick-stealer randomly
wandered up to the factory, in the same way that the car drivers ran-
domly drove past the brick-drop intersection. But it is more plausible that
the brick-stealers share common traits; common traits that make them
more likely to belong to one of the three types of ex ante markets laid out
above. In this case, they are probably all selling their bricks on similar
markets. They could also belong to a brick collector's society.109
When relationships such as these exist between defendants, the de-
fendant firm can find convenient entry points for litigation. It need not
necessarily resort to a defendant class action because it can go after the
agency, organization, or other binding agent between the defendants. For
example, when authors and publishers of the American Society of Com-
posers tried to move against the Girl Scouts for copyright infringement-
for singing copyrighted songs around the campfire-the plaintiff authors
and publishers did not have to go after thousands of young Girl Scout
members nationwide." 0 Instead, the plaintiffs went directly to the na-
tional organization that binds the girl scouts together."' The push toward
potentially making Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") liable in illegal
music downloading can be understood in a similar vein." 2
C. Aggregate Analysis
The aggregate analysis principle adds an extra layer to both the for-
ward-looking deterrence and the dynamic effects principles. The aggre-
gate analysis principle holds that we should look at deterrence and dy-
namic effects at an aggregate, system-wide level. In this section I will
show how the analysts discussing both the Internet and corporate fraud
examples have missed this aggregate picture.
109. The hard case, a version of which I consider in the system design section, would be if they
each found the brick valuable for some reason that didn't require re-sale, e.g., as a mantle piece.
I 10. See Ken Ringle, ASCAP Changes its Tune; Never Intended to Collect Fees for Scouts'
Campfire Songs, Group Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 1996, at C03.
Ill. See id.
112. See, for example, In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2003),
where Judge Posner upheld the grant of a preliminary injunction against a website that provided file-
sharing services that were ultimately used for violation of federal copyright law by individual mem-
bers of the public.
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1. Cost Benefit Considerations
At the outset, a distinction should be made between (1) an overall
cost-benefit valuation; i.e., do we want to reduce the activity or care lev-
els of downloading of copyrighted material? And, (2) a comparison of
the cost of precautions versus the benefit of harm reduction associated
with that precaution. Conflating these two distinct evaluations may lead
to some confusion. To make each stage clear, I will label the first cost-
benefit analysis process "valuation" and the second (applying the
Fried/Rosenberg framework), "determining optimal precautions."
In both stages, an aggregate perspective is important. At the valua-
tion stage, aggregation means we must determine overall how much util-
ity is being lost, and how much utility is being gained from a particular
activity which individuals or firms are engaging in. Class actions factor
into this analysis in a preliminary way; it is more likely that we will have
aggregate analysis when there is a class action then when there is not.
The reason is that courts will have to consider welfare/utility across all
members of the class, not just the ones listed on the court documents as
representatives. When adjudicating, courts will weigh both sides at the
aggregate level.
2. Aggregate Analysis of Internet Governance
When discussions of Internet governance are raised, popular (and to
a large extent academic) discussion has focused on illegal file sharing.113
Jonathan Zittrain argues that such a narrow focus is greatly misguided:
"Current scholarship about 'Internet governance' largely fails to appreci-
ate this larger picture, rendering most of its deliberations absurdly nar-
row, with public policy recommendations that have a near-uselessly short
shelf life .... "ll4 Zittrain is announcing an aggregate analysis principle,
suggesting that analysts should be considering more than simply the is-
sue immediately before them.
The aggregate analysis principle has great bite in the Internet con-
text because of the Internet's great "generativity." Zittrain defines "gen-
erativity" as a function of (1) how deeply a technology leverages a set of
possible tasks; (2) its "adaptability to a range of different tasks"; (3) its
"ease of mastery"; and (4) its "accessibility."' The Internet provides a
113. For a summary of this literature, see generally JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT (2008). The three cases in this area cited most often are: MGM
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005); Aimster, 334 F.3d 634; A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
114. Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet-And How to Save It 30 (Feb. 2005) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (on file with the Denver University Law Review) (draft version 1.6 of the Zit-
train's book published in 2008).
115. Id. at 1981.
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new "generative grid" whose potential is still being realized.11 6 What
does talk of a generative grid, or of the Internet so generally, mean for
defendant class actions? It means that our analysis of defendant class
actions in the Internet context cannot rest solely on the costs of file-
sharing. Rather, it must also consider how file sharing may contribute to
generative goods.
Hamdani and Klement provide an example of analysis that stops
short. They introduce considerations of overall social welfare in their
analysis of a proposed class defense mechanism, but do not carry out an
aggregate analysis. In considering a hypothetical lawsuit from the RIAA
against an individual, for instance, Hamdani and Klement detail how an
individual's incentive will be to settle for $3,000, even when they have
done nothing illegal.1 17 They argue, correctly, that "the ex post settlement
decisions of defendants impact the ex ante decisions of other Internet
users" whether to download music.' But it does not necessarily follow,
as they argue in the next sentence, that "[w]hen defendants settle even
when they may have a good defense, there is a considerable risk of ex-
cessively deterring music downloads by . . . Internet users."' The rea-
son it does not necessarily follow is that optimal deterrence must be de-
termined at an aggregate level. In other words, we may want to deter
perfectly legitimate uses of file-sharing (and therefore make some inno-
cents pay $3,000) if we believe that it will benefit society overall (by
keeping the bad guys out of the game). By the same logic, we may want
to allow illegal file-sharing by some crooks, if we believe that it will
benefit society overall (by letting the good guys stay in the game).
This Article takes no substantive position on what the legal rule
should be about file sharing; i.e., whether we should hold Internet Serv-
ice Providers (ISPs) liable, or whether the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act ("DMCA") properly assigns liability.120 This Article does, however,
116. The generative grid phrase is Zittrain's. See id. at 1975. Scholarship is emerging to try and
assess the myriad of effects the Internet has had on our lives. See, e.g., Eugene Borgida & Emily N.
Stark, New Media and Politics: Some Insights From Social and Political Psychology, 48 AM.
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 467, 467 (2004) (investigating "the extent to which the Internet is providing ...
an important and increasingly influential forum for acquiring politically relevant information").
117. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 9, at 701. The reason is that they face a decision between
settling for $3,000 or going through a lawsuit for $50,000 just to avoid payment.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. The DMCA was signed into law in 1998, and among other things, holds ISPs liable for
their users' illegal actions if the ISPs do not follow guidelines laid out by the Act (e.g. removing
offensive material, reporting violations, etc.). See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006). 1 also take no view here
as to whether it is in the Record Company's best long term interest to prosecute file-swappers. Some
have suggested that alternative strategies may be better suited:
Coverage of the lawsuits could hurt as much as help the anti-piracy crusade. Anthony
Prapkanis, a University of California-Santa Cruz professor of social psychology, says that
while people may be sympathetic to the music industry's plight, "the image is out there of
the bully ganging up on people with the least amount of money, the rich taking from the
poor."
Jefferson Graham, RIAA Lawsuits Bring Consternation, Chaos, USA TODAY, Sept. 10, 2003, at 4D.
108 [Vol. 88:1
2010] OVERLOOKED UTILITY 109
argue that we should assess the DMCA, and related decisions such as In
re Aimster Copyright Litigation,121 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc.,'22 and MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,123 under the aggregate
analysis principle. At a minimum, this will involve incorporation of sev-
eral strands of literature such as economic analysis of the effects of indi-
viduals' copyright infringement,124 as well as analysis of actual usage of
a file-sharing program, especially estimates of usage for illegal versus
legal purposes. 125 More importantly, such aggregate analysis also de-
mands that courts take seriously the technological aspects of the cases
they are dealing with. In the context of file-sharing, for instance, the fu-
ture is not in limiting the ability to trade, but in limiting the ability to
play, via Digital Rights Management ("DRM"). 12 6 Mark Stefik has ob-
served that despite the fact that "[e]veryday experience with computers
has led many to believe that anything digital is ripe for copying . . .
[b]ehind the scenes . .. technology is altering the balance once again."l27
121. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
122. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
123. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
124. In the context of music file-sharing, there remains an empirical debate over the effect of
illegal file sharing on music sales. See, e.g., Kai-Lung Hui & Ivan Png, Piracy and the Legitimate
Demand for Recorded Music, 2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y (2003), available at
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol2/issl/artll/ ("[T]he demand for music CDs de-
creased with piracy, suggesting that 'theft' outweighed the 'positive' effects of piracy. However, the
impact of piracy on CD sales was considerably less than estimated by industry."); Stan J. Liebowitz,
File-Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction? 32 (Ctr. for the Analysis of Prop.
Rights, Working Paper No. 04-03, 2004), available at http://som.utdallas.edu/centers/capri/
documents/destruction.pdf (finding that the evidence seems compelling that file-sharing is responsi-
ble for the recent large decline in CD sales for which it has been blamed); Felix Oberholzer &
Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis (Mar. 2004),
available at http://www.unc.edul-cigar/papers/FileSharing March2004.pdf (unpublished working
paper) ("Downloads have an effect on sales which is statistically indistinguishable from zero, despite
rather precise estimates. [But], these estimates are of moderate economic significance and are incon-
sistent with claims that file sharing is the primary reason for the recent decline in music sales.");
Rafael Rob & Joel Waldfogel, Piracy on the High C's: Music Downloading, Sales Displacement,
and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 10874, Oct. 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl0874.pdf ("[D]ownloading
reduces their per capita expenditure (on hit albums released 1999-2003) from $126 to $100 but
raises per capita consumer welfare by $70."); Alejandro Zentner, Measuring the Effect of Online
Music Piracy on Music Sales (2004), available at http://economics.uchicago.eduldownload/
musicindustryoctl2.pdf (unpublished working paper) (finding that peer-to-peer usage reduces the
probability of buying music by an average of 30 percent, and that without file sharing, sales in 2002
would have been around 7.8 percent higher).
125. Some evidence from Russia suggests that even amongst young people, use of the Internet
for illegal file-sharing is not a common activity. Oxana Palesh, Kasey Saltzman & Cheryl Koopman,
Internet Use and Attitudes Towards Illicit Internet Use Behavior in a Sample of Russian College
Students, 7 CYBERPSYCHOL. & BEHAv. 553, 553 (2004) ("Among Internet users, most reported
having Internet access either at home or at a friends' home, and 16 % reported having Internet access
from work, school, or a computer center. Among Internet users, the main purpose was for school-
related activities (60%), followed by e-mail (55%), entertainment (50%), chatting (24%), and search-
ing for pornography (6%).").
126. For an introduction, see ROB FRIEDEN & CHRISTY CARPENTER, DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT 2, 6 (2004).
127. Mark Stefik, Trusted Systems, SCI. AM., Mar. 1997, at 78, 78.
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If courts are not aware, or deliberately choose to avoid discussion of
what's going on "behind the scenes," then their rulings and analyses are
not only likely to be out-dated, but also could be seriously flawed. For
instance, what if DRM technology had already advanced to a stage where
recording artists could protect (with great assurance) everything they
wanted to, but courts (unaware of this development) went ahead with a
legal regime that severely limited file sharing? The result would be over-
deterrence. On the other hand, if courts errantly believed that DRM had
reached a point where the state-of-the-art was to produce files incapable
of being pirated (when in fact this was not the case), they would under-
deter file-swapping. The substantive analysis is beyond the scope of this
Article, but I have aimed to demonstrate that if courts do not take techno-
logical considerations into account, they violate the aggregate analysis
principle, and likely produce sub-optimal outcomes as a result.
3. Aggregate Analysis of Corporate Wrongdoing
At first glance, the high-profile corporate wrongdoing over the past
few years may seem an odd place to think about defendant class actions.
The defendants are not numerous, hard to identify, or judgment proof.
Why, then, should we consider defendant class actions a potentially use-
ful tool? The answer, as it did in the Internet context, centers on the re-
alization that there is something more going on here than simply the ac-
tions of the named defendants. In the Internet case, that "something
more" is more readily identifiable: complex and changing technologies
are clearly tied into the cases at bar. In the corporate fraud cases, the
"something more" is subtler.
Drawing on social psychology and research on the corporate envi-
ronment, the "something more" that a defendant class action can aim its
reach at is the "situation" or "corporate climate" that may contribute
mightily to fraud and wrongdoing.128 There is a longstanding consensus
amongst social psychologists that we commit a "fundamental attribution
error" in attributing actions to individual choices, rather than to situ-
ational pressures. As articulated by Phillip Zimbardo and Michael
Leippe, "we tend to look for the person in the situation more than we
search for the situation that makes the person."l 29 The value of a defen-
dant class action is that it has the potential to get at the "situation" be-
cause it will implicate virtually everyone working in the office.
128. See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction To The Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, And Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 129, 201,
221-30 (2003) (providing an introduction to social psychology literature in the corporate law con-
text); see also Christopher W. Williams, Paul R. Lees-Haley & J. Randall Price, The Role of Coun-
terfactual Thinking and Causal Attribution in Accident-Related Judgments, 26 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 2100, 2109-10 (1996) (providing an introduction to the implications of the attribution
theory in the legal arena).
129. PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATrITUDE CHANGE AND
SOCIAL INFLUENCE 93 (199 1).
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Research and expert commentary on the corporate environment
suggests that situational pressures to commit wrongs are indeed intense.
When he talked about the "numbers game" that corporate executives
sometimes play, former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt suggested "that
almost everyone in the financial community shares responsibility . . .
[and] [clorporate management isn't operating in a vacuum. In fact, the
different pressures and expectations placed by, and on, various partici-
pants in the financial community appear to be almost self-
perpetuating."13 0 One of the most comprehensive studies of moral action
in the workplace is Robert Jackall's study, Moral Mazes.131 Jackall en-
gaged in extensive case studies of two firms, and found that most middle
managers would sacrifice their own morals in order to fit in: "Team play
also means . . . 'aligning oneself with the dominant ideology of the mo-
ment,' or. . . 'bowing to whichever god currently holds sway."'l32
If it is the case that it is not just a few top executives that are con-
tributing to the harm caused by the firm, then a legal regime which points
liability solely toward those CEOs is not likely to achieve optimal deter-
rence. Consider Federal Insurance Co. v. Tyco International Ltd. ,3
where separate actions were brought against former Tyco CEO Dennis
Kozlowski, former chief lawyer Mark Belnick, and former CFO Mark
Swartz.1 34 From a deterrence perspective, members of society (and most
especially Tyco shareholders) did not care who actually cooked the
books. What society wants is for this sort of firm behavior not to happen
again in the future, by Tyco, or by any other firm. In order to achieve that
deterrence objective, we must have an understanding of the causal fac-
tors for the fraud. To the extent that it was not just a few "bad apples,"
but instead is in part driven systematically by certain kinds of corporate
cultures, we want a legal device that can possibly change those cultures.
A defendant class action might do that. In operation, if future members
of a firm knew that they could be held liable (as a defendant class mem-
ber) for any harm caused by the firm, it seems more likely that they
would stand up to their bosses when asked to do illegal tasks.
4. Additional Comments on Aggregate Analysis
In response to likely concerns, two additional comments should be
made in regards to aggregate analysis. First, is aggregate analysis too
much for the courts to handle? I believe not, as courts (themselves and in
conjunction with administrative agencies) already engage in substantial,
130. Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the New York University
Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998).
131. SIMON JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988).
132. Id. at 52.
133. 422 F. Supp. 2d 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
134. Id. at 360.
2010] 111
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIEW
aggregate cost-benefit analysis.'35 It can also be said that even if courts at
present are not well-equipped to handle these sorts of analyses, there may
be other parts of the system that courts can out-source to carry out the
analysis. The Government Accountability Office ("GAO") frequently
engages in these sorts of analyses.
My final comment is one that bends in a normative direction. When
taken together as a pair, the Internet and corporate fraud examples make
it clear that defendant class actions are not designed to go after a particu-
lar kind of group, i.e., "the little guy" or the "big, bad corporation."
Rather, the defendant class action is a neutral tool that can be employed
whenever it is needed to kick-start informational markets into gear.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
This section of the paper identifies the major challenges courts face
in implementing defendant class actions. Although the challenges are
significant, I build on the proposals made by Netto and put forth a num-
ber of system design elements which may make defendant class actions
more feasible and more capable of achieving the objective of optimal
deterrence.
In addition to the Internet and corporate fraud examples which I
have already discussed, this section will also address a third, more diffi-
cult, type of case: the case where there are defendants who appear to
have no connection to each other. To make this hard case concrete, let's
consider the following scenario. One-hundred thousand individuals
across the world illegally sneak a camera into their local movie theatre
and digitally record a blockbuster movie. They then show this digital
movie to their friends and family, who consequently do not pay for either
movie admission or for the DVD when it is released. This is a case where
there is no discernible "market" relationship between any of the defen-
dants. Note that it is not the size of the class that matters, but the rela-
tionship between them. There could be one million illegal tapers of the
movie, but if they all acted independently there would still be no easy
way to tie them together as a class. As I proceed with my discussion of
system design, I will return to this hard case and how the general theory
of defendant class actions should be applied to it.
A. Preliminary Considerations
A discussion of defendant class action implementation must begin
with a discussion of principles. In this Section I lay out several funda-
135. See Robert W. Hahn, Policy Watch: Government Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of
Regulation, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 201, 201-10 (1998) (discussing the cost-benefit analysis in the
government context); see also David Whiteman, The Fate of Policy Analysis in Congressional
Decision Making: Three Types of Use in Committees, 38 W. POL, Q. 294, 297 (1985) (discussing
aggregate principles used in the legislative decision-making process).
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mental functions of tort law that the defendant class action must serve.
To be sure, these are not the only functions of tort law. Nevertheless,
they serve as a useful starting point for constructing, from the bottom up,
a system in which the defendant class action can play a central role.
1. Insurance and Redistributive Functions of Tort Law
The tort system serves an insurance and redistributive function as
well as a deterrence function.' In the context of defendant class actions,
if the harm to the plaintiff can be identified, it does not seem that having
a large number of small harms (as opposed to a single large harm) should
affect insurance availability or premiums. If there were a market for
these insurance claims, this situation might be different because having a
larger number of smaller claims would make it more difficult for insurers
to get paid.137 Questions of redistribution are taken up again under the
issue of fee-shifting and making sure that class defendants have proper
economic incentives to fully litigate a defense for the entire class.
2. Deference to the Market and Legislative Bodies
I adopt the position that as a guiding principle, courts should be def-
erential to the market they find in operation. As Fried and Rosenberg
observe, "[n]o logical impediment exists to the market's serving as a full
substitute for legal intervention to achieve the social objective of ensur-
ing optimal precautions."l 38 Because the cost-benefit calculations, espe-
cially at the aggregate level, can be quite complicated, I also take the
position that courts should be deferential to legislatures and administra-
tive bodies that have conducted research on particular issues. Where
courts see that legislatures are captured by interest groups whose goals
may not be based on objective analysis and research, and when legisla-
tures are not adhering to the principle of aggregate analysis, then they
should take more independent actions.
3. Activity and Care Levels
Throughout considerations of system design, it is important to keep
in mind the distinction between activity levels and care levels. This is a
point seemingly missed by Hamdani and Klement. Using the Hamdani
and Klement example, individuals may react to RIAA litigation in one of
two general ways. First, they may simply reduce their activity level. This
is the only possibility that the authors consider.139 But second, individu-
als may react to RIAA litigation by increasing their care level. They may
136. See FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 55, 69-70.
137. David Rosenberg, Deregulating Insurance Subrogation: Towards an Ex Ante Market in
Tort Claims I (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus. Discussion Paper No. 395, 2002),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center/. I leave this question for another day,
as currently such a market does not exist.
138. See FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 6, at 45.
139. See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 9, at 724.
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take extra measures to insure that they are not found liable. This care
level adjustment may take one of two forms. It may take the traditional
form of trying to avoid the harm; i.e., downloading only with approved
programs. But it may also take another form of trying to avoid detection.
The distinct possibility of this "circumvention care" is particularly im-
portant to consider in the context of defendant class actions involving
technology.
B. Identification & Monitoring
Identifying exactly who is generating the harm/risk may arise as an
acute problem in the defendant class action context. Initially, there are
several distinctions to make. First, in order to work effectively, class
members need to identify not only who is causing the harm, but also how
much marginal contribution is being made by each member. Monitoring
can be introduced here as a form of "repeated identification"-re-
evaluating on a regular basis who is in the market and what their market
share is. Depending on the stability and fluidity of the market, this moni-
toring may be more or less costly.
A second distinction to make is between "ability" and "feasibility"
to identify harm/risk producers. Prohibitively high identification costs
may make it infeasible for identification to occur in some situations
when it is theoretically possible (in a costless world). Putting these two
concepts together, the identification problem can be considered along a
continuum. Table 4 provides a rough outline of the scope of this prob-
lem.
Table 4. The Scope of the Identification Problem
Perfect ID Strong ID Mid-Strong Mid-Weak Weak ID No ID
ID ID
Know who Know who Not entirely Know the Not entirely Do
caused the caused the sure who general sure which not
harm and harm, a caused "group" of "groups" know
each party's little less harm, but people who are respon- who
marginal sure of can narrow caused the sible, and caused
contribu- marginal it down, and harm, but have no idea the
tions contribu- can do the not the of marginal harm
tions same for specific contribu-
marginal individuals tions to









1. Legal Tools to Address the Problem of Identification
Looking at Table 4, the goal of the legal system should be to enable
parties to move as far as possible to the left, toward the ideal of perfect
identification. There are three plausible ways that the legal system might
improve identification of defendants and their relative contributions to
harm. As a first cut, the legal system can use sub-classes to reduce its
workload. Sub-classes will be most beneficial when it is easier to identify
the marginal causal contribution of some members of the defendant
class, relative to others. In practice, courts have carved out sub-classes in
larger defendant class actions since at least 1968.140 By breaking up the
larger class, the court reduces the number of individuals on the right
hand side of the table. In an Alabama case, where all state registrars of
voters were made into a defendant class, the court administered its ruling
on the basis of different sub-classes. 141 The "harm" in this Alabama case
was to convicted felons who were thrown off the voter rolls.142 The court
found that some counties had done more harm than others, and appropri-
ately tailored their remedy. 143 The same logic can be applied by courts in
other defendant class action contexts.
The second option courts can undertake is to create incentives for
self-identification by adjusting presumptions on marginal contribution to
harm, and then allowing for rebuttal of that presumption with sufficient
evidence. To flesh this out, it is helpful to consider the numerical exam-
ple in Table 5. Let's assume that a plaintiff has experienced total harm of
500, and has won in court. The defendant class is composed of 100 indi-
viduals, and neither the plaintiff nor the court knows which defendants
produced what amount of harm. Each individual defendant does not
know the other defendant's contribution to harm, but he knows his own.
He knows how many people are in the class, so he knows that the aver-
age harm is 5. Let's say that the distribution is as presented in Table 5.
140. See Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 725-27
(N.D. Ill. 1968) (finding a defendant class appropriate in a patent infringement case, and in adminis-
tering it, creating several sub-classes).
141. Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362, 365 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
142. See id.
143. See id. at 367-68.
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Table 5. Hypothetical: Contributions to Harm
[A] Individual con- 2 3 4 5 6 8 10 TOTAL
tribution to harm:
[B] Number of indi- 5 25 25 15 10 10 10 100
viduals:
[A] x [B] =
[C] Sub-Total of 10 75 100 75 60 80 100 500
Harm:
The puzzle is this: if we cannot directly observe their contributions
to harm, how do we get the various sub-groups to volunteer, ex post,
information about their contributions to harm? Courts may be able to use
damage assignments as a carrot-and-stick. In this example, instead of
setting the average damage payment for defendants at 5, courts could set
it at 8. Initially such a move would strike off over-deterrence because
total damages would equal 800. But courts could, at the same time they
set damages to 8, offer defendant class members a chance to reduce their
liability to 6 if they can show that they contributed less than 8 to harm. In
this example, 80 people would rationally come forward to get their liabil-
ity reduced by 2. The 10 in the "8 category" would break even, and the
10 in the "10" category would get away with 2. Total damages would
thus be 800 - 160 = 640. There is likely some over-deterrence here, but it
should be noted that the over-deterrence is the cost of identification.
Over time, courts could calibrate their carrot-and-stick game.
A third option, which is probably quite costly and therefore not as
practical, is for the court to appoint a guardian or special master specifi-
cally for the purpose of determining marginal contributions to risk.
Guardians have been a frequent topic of discussion in the class action
context.144 Here, "special master" may be a more appropriate title, but the
person charged with the responsibility of looking at contributions to
harm will also likely be faced with questions of settlement and in-
fighting as well.
In addition to these mechanisms, courts must also recognize that
their choice of representative can affect information production.145 A
144. See Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for Monitoring
Class Action Lawyers, 21 REV. LITIG. 25, 26-28 (2002) (discussing private lawyers' roles in the
"guardian" class-action context and who should supervise those lawyers); see also Edward Brunet,
Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
403, 466 (2003) ("The theory of appointing a guardian ad litem is deceptively simple. The guardian
will represent the interests of the absent class members and thereby monitor the behavior of class
and defense counsel during settlement negotiations.").
145. Courts have long recognized the problem of defendant class representation, but not usu-




common problem with large defendant classes is how many and which
defendants should be assigned as class representatives. Courts have en-
countered what I call the "red rover" problem; just as in the game red
rover, where kids seek to run through the weakest link on the other side,
plaintiffs want to pick the weakest link as the defendant class representa-
tive. Such was the case in Leon N. Weiner & Assocs., Inc. v. Krapf,146
where a corporate lot owner sought to name just one lot owner as repre-
sentative of a class of 203 lot owners.1 47 The corporate owner sought
declaratory judgment that its property was not subject to restrictions, and
the alleged "harm" the corporate owner experienced was the potential
restrictions on the land as carried by other lot owners.148
Faced with this situation, the court recognized that the single named
defendant was not in a position to adequately produce information on the
many possible restrictions that might arise from the deeds of other lot
owners.149 The court concluded that the plaintiff corporate owner "se-
lected one neighbor to represent the property interests of 203 lot owners,
many of whom will likely have different interests and views. The effect
of Weiner's motion is to place the costs of notice, discovery and litiga-
tion on the shoulders of the Krapfs."150 Such costs would make it virtu-
ally impossible for the defendant representative to engage his peers and
kick-start the information market.' 5 1
C. Enforcement
Even in some situations in which identification and monitoring are
practical, enforcement may not be. Here, "enforcement" means getting
other defendant class members to contribute to (i) the litigation costs, and
then (ii) if necessary, the damage costs as well. Enforcement is difficult
because without a well-working network between defendants (i.e., with-
out an umbrella organization), no single class member (or even a small
pocket of class members who may be strongly connected) can achieve
Commentators have frequently criticized the potential for inadequate representation of
defendant classes. Because the named defendant generally does not seek his representa-
tive status and often vehemently opposes it, a court may fear that an unwilling representa-
tive will necessarily be a poor one. Related to this concern is the fear that the plaintiff
will exercise his power of selection to appoint a weak, ineffective opponent as class rep-
resentative. "It is a strange situation where one side picks out the generals for the enemy's
army."
79 F.R.D. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (citations omitted).
146. No. 8938, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988).
147. Id. at * L.
148. Id. at *4.
149. Id. at *8-9.
150. Id. at *9.
151. A similar analysis was made in a case in Illinois where a single owner of a Shell gas
station was proposed as representative of a class of all Shell gas owners in the state. In rejecting this
proposed representative, the court reasoned, "The entire economic burden of defending the present
suit was thrust upon one man, Razowsky. His financial stake in the outcome of the suit was not
shown to be greater than that of any other of the hundreds of Shell dealers in Illinois." Gaffney v.
Shell Oil Co., 312 N.E.2d 753, 759 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
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the economies of scale required to effectively enforce group-wide poli-
cies. In the face of such an enforcement problem, individuals ex ante
would look to the legal system to provide mechanisms for making en-
forcement feasible.
On this enforcement point Hamdani and Klement offer a useful
analysis with their class defense proposal. They propose a "class de-
fense" mechanism, a "defendant-initiated procedure designed to create
parity between a single plaintiff and a group of similarly positioned de-
fendants." 5 2 With help from the court (via fee-shifting), a defendant
could use Hamdani and Klement's class defense procedure to reach out
and essentially force contributions from the entire class.' 5 3 Hamdani and
Klement's proposal allows defendants to class themselves with less judi-
cial intervention than would currently be required. Legal tools that make
it easier for aggregation of claims promote the aggregate analysis princi-
ple, and thus the forward-looking deterrence principle as well.
Hamdani and Klement's proposal runs into trouble, however, when
we reach the hard hypothetical case of the blockbuster movie DVDs.
Suppose that through some investigation, the movie's production studio
is able to identify 100 of the 100,000 people who illegally taped the
movie. Suppose too that the movie studio then asks for certification of a
defendant class for all illegal recorders (which they have estimated at
100,000 based on lost revenue from movie tickets and DVD sales). The
problem at this point is that even if the defendants "class" themselves, no
single defendant is in a position to serve as a representative for the entire
class. Even when the hundred identified defendants put their resources
together, it is not going to scale up enough to match the movie studio's
legal resources. This is a problem because the issues may not be fully
litigated. For instance, perhaps the movie studio made some contribution
to the harm, which would not come out unless the defendant class had
better representation.
To deal with this hard case, it is helpful to recall that a forward-
looking court hopes to minimize similar harms like these from arising in
the future.154 In order to arrive at optimal deterrence, we need to conduct
aggregate analysis. In this hard case, the only way to achieve fully liti-
gated aggregate analysis would be for the court to incur tremendous costs
and essentially fund a legal team for the defendant class. The great ma-
jority of the defendant class remains anonymous, and thus would not
contribute to a pool to fund the legal fees. Given these prohibitive costs,
and the requirement of aggregate analysis which fails in this hard case,
152. Hamdani & Klement, supra note 9, at 7 10.
153. The procedure assumes that identification and monitoring are possible. If a defendant has
no idea who else is in his class, he will not obtain maximum benefits from classing himself.
154. "Fairness" to this particular group of movie tapers or to the production company is not, in
the general welfare framework of this article, at issue.
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the general theory of this Article suggests that here, defendant class ac-
tions will not be an optimal legal tool.'55
While defendant class actions are not optimal in these hard cases, it
should be emphasized that such cases are very rare in practice. The Judi-
cial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, for instance, usually seems to find
a few "big players" or some other market mechanisms by which to iden-
tify representatives for the diverse parties involved in litigation. The ac-
tual cases where defendant class actions have been certified also point to
consistent findings of links between defendants. 156 More generally, it is
difficult to find frequently occurring instances in which there are no
market relationships between defendants in a potential defendant class.
D. Free Riding
The free riding problem is the result of identification, monitoring,
and enforcement failures. Examining the defendant class action, there are
two types of free rider problems we need to consider. The first is most
analogous to the hypothetical case already discussed in Section I. It is
where a class-wide defense would be beneficial to all defendants, but no
single defendant can fund the defense adequately because they cannot
extract payments from the free-riders in their class. As Netto has pointed
out, "Only economy of scale in investment in the lawsuit can overcome
the problem of the reluctance of defendants to assume the litigation as
class representative. This objective is achieved with incentives for the
class counsel through an optimal mechanism of compensation for his
performance."' 57 In these cases, an individual ex ante would desire that
the legal system provide a means by which the defense can be properly
funded. Individual defendants would desire a mast-tying device.
But a second sort of free-riding problem may also exist. This second
type of free-riding problem arises when the defendants would not be
better off if they all stopped causing the harm. Rather, it is society that
would be better off because the utility that the defendants are deriving
155. Although they arrived at the conclusion by different means, the court in Angel Music, Inc.
v. ABC Sports, Inc., a copyright case with a large potential class of copyright infringers, denied class
certification. 112 F.R.D. 70, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The Angel court based its ruling on the lack of
connections between defendants, and issues of standing. Id. at 77. The plaintiff, Angel Music, argued
that "the members of the defendant class have engaged in a common violation of the Copyright Act
which places their actions within the juridical link exception to LaMar," but the court recognized
that no such relationship existed. Id. at 75-76. What the court could have also said was that when
confronted with this hard case of copying infringement, a class device was not likely to create links
between future defendants in similar situations.
156. In a defendant class action brought under the Sherman anti-trust laws, for instance, Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) targeted the American Society of Composers, Authors and
Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) in order to get at the numerous defendant
musicians and performers in the proposed class. Broad. Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1, 4 (1979).
157. Netto, supra note 4, at 93.
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from their harmful behavior is not equal to the dis-utility they cause oth-
ers (the plaintiff).
The ex ante perspective is crucial for understanding this second free
riding problem. Once an individual knows if he will be in the defendant
class, it is no longer in the individual's interest to maximize utility over
both states (plaintiff and defendant) of the world. To see how these inter-
ests can diverge once we move out of the ex ante world, consider this
numerical example.
One hundred defendants each cause 5 in harm to the plaintiff when
they steal a brick, for a total of 500 harm. They derive only 3 in utility
from each harm, by selling the brick, for a total of 300 utility. Plaintiff
cannot identify every member of the class, but when they are identified,
plaintiff knows that the marginal contribution to harm is 5. Overall, we
want to deter the defendants if we can do it for less than 200. Let's say
plaintiff can find 20 of the wrongdoers, and every time wins against them
for their marginal contribution, 5. When we look overall at defendant and
plaintiff (Table 6), we see that optimal deterrence is not achieved be-
cause the defendants wind up 200 better off, while the plaintiff is 400
worse off. The harm producers do not bear the loss.
Table 6. Social outcomes without a Certified Defendant Class
Defendant Class Plaintiff Society Overall
Initial gain / loss 100 people gain- 100 wrong-doers -200
ing 3 utility each each causing
from their plaintiff 5 in:
wrong-doing = + -500
300
Subsequent legal 20 people get Successfully No change
gain / loss sued and lose 5 suing 20 people
each: -100 for 5 gain each:
+100








Table 7. Social outcomes with a Certified Defendant Class
Defendant Class Plaintiff Society Overall
Initial gain / loss 100 people gain- 100 wrong-doers -200
ing 3 utility each causing 5 in
from their harm a piece: -
wrong-doing = + 500
300
Subsequent legal 20 people get Successfully No change
gain / loss sued, and get suing the defen-
certified as dant class: +500
Defendant Class,
so must pay the
entire harm, lose
500 total: -500
Final Result -200 0 -200
with harm pro-
ducers bearing
the loss, so op-
timal deter-
rence
Now consider how a defendant class action would change the final
results (Table 7). If the 20 defendants were certified as a defendant class,
they would be liable not only for their marginal contribution (the 100),
but for the entire 500 in harm. This would benefit society overall because
it would create the proper deterrent effect, but it would not benefit the
defendant class. Thus, one's desire for a defendant class would depend
on whether one knows if they will be in the class or not.
Courts encountering this issue-making some defendants liable for
the harms of the entire class-have been wary of pushing forward. In In
re the Gap Stores Securities Litigation,'5 8 the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California suggested:
[A] defendant class action may be simply an inappropriate method of
adjudicating any case where the combination of punitive damages
and joint and several liability threaten to transform a statutory
scheme for personal accountability into ready martyrdom for the un-
lucky defendant whose deep pocket will pay for the sins of the multi-
tude. 159
158. 79 F.R.D. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
159. Id. at 295. A New Jersey court echoed a similar sentiment in a defendant class action case:
[lit is noted that the New Jersey Antitrust Act, under which relief is requested, contem-
plates joint and several liability. The accumulated damages, trebled pursuant to statute,
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The court's focus solely on the "unlucky defendant" is misplaced,
for there is also an "unlucky" plaintiff who has experienced harm. The
court should look to the good of both plaintiff and defendant, using ag-
gregate analysis to consider the overall social welfare implications of its
legal rule.
My argument for aggregate analysis is distinct from Hamdani and
Klement's approach. When they propose the "class defense" mechanism,
they fail to recognize that whether it is a plaintiff who wants to certify a
defendant class or defendants who want to certify themselves, our
evaluation of the merits of that class certification should rest upon the
determination of overall benefit to society. If one's primary social objec-
tive is maximizing overall utility, then focusing solely on maximizing
plaintiffs' or defendants' utility is misguided.
1. Solving the Free Riding Problem with Fee Shifting
The free rider problem is one of the most difficult challenges to
overcome in successfully carrying out a defendant class action. The
problem, however, has been addressed through various fee-shifting pro-
posals. Most on point is Netto's proposed solution, drawing on the Eng-
lish rule for attorney fees:
Defendant-favoring fee shifting is considered fee-shifting on a one-
way (or one-side) basis, granting fees only to the defendant's attorney
when the defendants prevail in the lawsuit, but not awarding fees to
the plaintiffs lawyer even if he wins the case....
The advantages of the defendant-favoring fee-shifting system
include: (i) overcoming the asymmetric costs between separate litiga-
tion and collective suit, aggregating the multitude of defendants, (ii)
compensating the class counsel by equalizing his investment in the
litigation with the amount of the fees award; and (iii) precluding nui-
sance value suits.160
The fee-shifting literature also provides other solutions relevant to
defendant class actions. Particularly useful is Joseph Miller's work on
the free rider problem faced by those who challenge the validity of a
recoverable by the entire class of mortgagors from the entire class of mortgagees, may
aggregate many millions of dollars. Yet, if the class recovery were allowed, each member
of defendant class, no matter how minor its participation in the scheme, would be indi-
vidually answerable for the full amount of the judgment. We conclude that such a result
would constitute a major alteration in the substantive legal relations between the parties
and goes beyond the intent of class action policy.
Kronisch v..Howard Say. Inst., 335 A.2d 587, 598 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (citing 3B JAMES
wM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE T 23.45[3] (2d ed. 1996)).
160. Netto, supra note 4, at 114-16.
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patent.16' Miller begins his analysis by stating, "A court judgment that a
patent claim is invalid is a public good. And obtaining such a judgment
requires the expensive, up-front cost of patent litigation. These facts sug-
gest that profit-maximizing firms will supply definitive patent challenges
at a less-than-optimal rate."1 62 A similar fact pattern is found in our con-
text. When a defendant class is engaged in activity that (as determined by
aggregate analysis) is good for society, that is a public good. Fully liti-
gating such a stance and showing that you are engaged in a public good
also involves substantial costs. Just as invalidating a patent invalidates it
for everyone, so winning the right to continue engaging in your actions
(i.e., file-swapping) allows everyone else to do the same. Given these
similarities, what can we learn from Miller's analysis? The first lesson is
one about theoretical approach. Miller sets the stage in this way:
Any bounty mechanism-in the patent context or elsewhere-
depends for its success upon when the bounty is awarded (or, put an-
other way, what one must do to earn it), and of what the bounty con-
sists (e.g., cash payment of $X, or enough money to cover expense
Y). A poor choice as to either feature reduces a bounty's effective-
ness at encouraging the desired result, making these features the best
focus in assessing whether a proposed bounty is likely to succeed. 163
Miller's analysis, not detailed further here, considers two existing bounty
and fee-shifting proposals in the patent context.16 4 Like Miller, I believe
that, "[p]aying a successful patent challenger a cash bounty that need not
be shared with others who benefit from the patent's invalidation directly
counteracts the free rider problem . . . ."165 The questions then become:
(i) When should the bounty be awarded, and (ii) How much should the
bounty be?
For defendant class actions, the timing question is somewhat easier
than the parallel question in patent law.166 The bounty should be awarded
at the litigation stage. A litigation stage bounty should be awarded to
those defendants who step up to defend on behalf of the entire class. If
too many lawyers step forward, the court can adjudicate between them,
either on the merits or via a lottery. The timing of this bounty would en-
courage full litigation of the issues. To pay for the bounty, the court
could mix-and-match between (i) fee shifting provisions in the event of a
win by the defense, (ii) a mandatory "litigation tax" imposed on all
members of the defendant class, and (iii) a sliding "litigation investment"
in which defendant class members could contribute to the class defense,
161. Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004).
162. Id at 688 (footnote omitted).
163. Id at 695-96 (footnote omitted).
164. Id at 696-704.
165. Id. at 704.
166. The reason for this is that the challengers to patent infringers must initiate the lawsuits.
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with a promise that they would receive their investment plus a percent-
age of the second-stage bounty. The amount of the bounty is something
that courts would have to determine based on the size of the class and the
issues involved.
Legislatures can be a partner in establishing and revising fee-
shifting programs. In Colorado in 1990, for instance, the company Ter-
restrial Systems sought to bring a class action suit against a class of tele-
vision owners that they alleged were using certain equipment to gain
unauthorized access to broadcasts.' 6 7 Fee-shifting in the case was guided
by legislative mandate.16 8 Under Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-4-
702(3), "in any action for civil theft of cable television service the pre-
vailing party shall be entitled to an award for his reasonable attorney
fees."' 69 The case illustrates the possibilities of fee-shifting to be de-
signed for specific situations and to be put into practice. Legislatures
thinking about social good for the state or country can produce back-
ground fee-shifting rules that address the free-rider concerns inherent in
defendant class actions.
All of these funding options still leave open the possibility that lead
defense lawyers might be quick to settle, or might work out a sweetheart
settlement for themselves. Because they might be representing defen-
dants who are not even known to the plaintiffs (thinking back to the iden-
tification problems), there seems a distinct possibility that whatever the
bounty or fee shifting regime, settlement incentives will remain askew.
To counter this, I propose making representation of defendant classes a
repeat game by looking favorably upon legal defense teams that have
successfully litigated in the past, and looking unfavorably upon those
who have lost, and especially unfavorably at those who have struck deals
that seemed to be of the sweetheart variety. Such repeat games are simi-
lar in spirit to proposals to use repeated auctions for informational pur-
poses. 70 If law firms in these cases are one-time players, then this solu-
tion will do little. But in a world of consolidated firms, I suspect that we
would see many repeat players. Because they are now maximizing reve-
nue not just in this particular case, but across all future cases, firms will
be less likely to engage in behavior that is not in keeping with the class
as a whole.
2. Solving the Free Riding Problem with Command-and-Control
If all else fails, full-blown government regulation in the form of
command-and-control may be necessary. This approach is likely to be
incredibly expensive. Terry Fisher has proposed such an approach for
167. Terrestrial Sys., Inc. v. Fenstemaker, 132 F.R.D. 71, 73 (D. Colo. 1990).
168. Id. at 73-74.
169. Id. at 73 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-702(3) (2004)).
170. See Abramowicz, supra note 100, at 351-52, 378-79.
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copyright.171 In his proposal, Fisher suggests that ISPs pay royalties,
based on the level of downloads of particular pieces, into a government-
run fund, which would then disperse those royalties to individual art-
ists. 172
It should be observed that many potential defendant class actions
have already been addressed by government regulation. The "tragedy of
the commons" cases preempt class action lawsuits by using regulatory
agencies (fines, taxes, etc.) to deter socially detrimental conduct such as
littering. The government may be in the best position to identify, moni-
tor, and deter the risk-creation of the large number of defendants. Where
the legislature has not already stepped in, however, courts may be more
hesitant to push for such regulation.173
E. Liability rules
While the legal rule may vary in some situations, the default rule
should be strict liability for the defendant class, with contributory negli-
gence. Strict liability would have the benefit of eliminating in-fighting
within the defendant class. For instance, none of the members of the
brick re-sellers association could show that they had not stolen bricks
from this particular factory. This should theoretically create very strong
self-monitoring and self-policing incentives. The logic is that if you do
something illegal, we all pay for it, so we're going to try and make sure
that you do not do anything illegal. Or, perhaps more realistically, we are
going to take more care and screen our members to make sure that we
reduce our risk.
The tool of vicarious liability could also be used to bring in an exist-
ing organization that has been standing on the sidelines or to generate the
creation of a new organization that no one had the incentive to start yet.
171. wILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT (2004).
172. Id. at 202-03. Fisher provides an overview of his compensation alternative and then uses
the rest of the chapter to elaborate in detail how such a system would operate.
173. A moderate, and potentially more cost-effective path for legislatures to take is to mandate
defendant class actions in certain circumstances. An illustration is a Missouri law that required
certain annexation proceedings to proceed via a class action. Mo. REV. STAT. § 71.015(l)(5)(c)
(2010). In City ofSt. Ann v. Buschard, the court explained this law as follows:
[The] Sawyer Act passed by the 67th General Assembly . . . provides that before a city
may proceed to annex any area otherwise authorized by law, it must file an action in the
Circuit Court of the County in which such unincorporated area is situated praying for a
declaratory judgment authorizing such annexation. According to the Sawyer Act: "The
petition in such action shall state facts showing:
1. The area to be annexed;
2. That such annexation is reasonable and necessary to the proper development of said
city; and
3. The ability of said city to furnish normal municipal services of said city to said unin-
corporated area within a reasonable time after said annexation is to become effective.
Such action shall be a class action against the inhabitants of such unincorporated area un-
der the provisions of Section 507.070 RS Mo."
299 S.W.2d 546, 547 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) (citation omitted).
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In thinking at the aggregate level about deterrence-even though it might
be too late for the particular group on trial to create an organization that
could have better protected their interests-future groups in similar situa-
tions will look to this court's ruling and realize that the threat of individ-
ual liability is so great that they are not going to even enter the market
(i.e., not going to take a single brick) unless they are sure that there is
some sort of organization/agency/binding agreement that they can be-
come a party to.
Allowing for contributory negligence makes sure that plaintiffs do
not get off the hook. It might be the case, for instance, that recording
artists made their work too easy to illegally obtain. Contributory negli-
gence could be assessed to the extent that a firm is not up to the state-of-
the-art with certain technological precautions.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has synthesized existing knowledge about defendant
class actions and proposed a general theory of defendant class actions.
The argument of the paper rests on three principles: (1) forward looking
deterrence; (2) dynamic effects; and (3) aggregate analysis. Of these
three, it is the aggregate analysis principle that overshadows the other
two in importance. The Article provides some illustrations of these prin-
ciples, and sketches out some ways in which these principles can be ap-
plied in system design. The proposals made in this Article challenge
courts and legislatures to broaden the scope of their legal reasoning be-
yond purely formalist concerns about the language of Rule 23.
There is much more to be considered in the defendant class action
context. It remains to be seen, for instance, how the proposed tools of
system design will hold up in practice. Because of the aggregate analysis
principle, more work needs to be done on bringing in additional data and
perspectives on the substantive issues at hand.
Despite these unanswered questions, it is my hope that this Article
has contributed to the literature by calling for scholars to frame their dis-
cussion of defendant class actions within a broader theoretical frame-
work. What is it that one wants a defendant class action to do? Which
parties should we think about when adjudicating defendant class actions?
How much marginal value do we expect defendant class actions to have
in particular situations? Continuing to answer these questions in more
detail will enable courts to feel more confident in their ability to certify
defendant classes. That, ultimately, will lead to greater social welfare.
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aff'd, 141 The Kan- Missouri benefits
F.3d 1405 sas City of The under the
(10th Cir. Star Com- Kansas Employee
1998) pany pur- City Star Retire-
suant to and/or ment In-
an agency The Kan- come
agreement sas City Security
since the Times Act of
delivery pursuant 1974
agent to an (ERISA),
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mented by with the
The Star" Kansas
after No- City Star
vember Company
30, 1984, that pro-
and on or vides or
prior to provided
November that the
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Amnesty 822 F. 1993 Amnesty Two Certifica-
Am. v. Supp. 297 Intl., on classes: tion not
County of (W.D. behalf of (1) all granted;
Allegheny Pa.), affd, Jane Does employees Alleged
142 [Vol. 88:1
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Terrestrial 132 1990 Terrestrial Television Case dis-
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff / Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
Class Class




Hammond No. 85 C 1990 James Under- Securities
v. Hen- 09829, Hammond writers case, al-
drickson 1990 U.S. repre- leged
Dist. sented by misrepre-
LEXIS Kidder sentations
11071 Peabody contained
(N.D. Ill.) & Co in a pro-
spectus
Alvarado 130 1990 Alvarado 34 Un- Securities
Partners, F.R.D. Partners, derwriters fraud case
L.P. v. 673 (D. L.P.
Mehta Colo.)
Winder 130 1990 Winder Manufac- Patent
Licensing, F.R.D. Licensing turers of infringe-
Inc. v. 392 (N.D. Inc. the pat- ment case;
King Ill.) ented class certi-
Instrument product at fication
Co .denied
Corp. issue denied
Luyando 124 1989 NY Indi- "All per- Challeng-
v. Bowen F.R.D. 52 viduals sons who ing $50
(S.D.N.Y. receiving are com- pass
rev 'd benefits missioners through
sub nom. from Aid of social law
Luyando to Fami- services
v. lies with districts in
Grinker, 8 Depend- New York
F.3d 948 ent Chil- State."












Williams 696 F. 1988 Illinois Five Voters'
v. State Supp. voters classes: suit about
Bd. of 1574 All per- judicial
Elections (N.D. Ill.) sons elections
144 [Vol. 88:1
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United 695 F. 1988 United Rainbow Seeking
States v. Supp. 294 States Family prelimi-
Rainbow (E.D. and its nary in-







DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions


































































































In re Ac- No. C-83- 1986 Stock- Under- Securities










Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions
















































































































DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Appendix Table 1. Defendant Class Actions












Emp'rs. 112 1986 Insurers Federal Class
Ins. of F.R.D. 52 Deposit action
Wausau v. (E.D. Insurance motion














Akron 110 1986 Reproduc- City Constitu-
Ctr. for F.R.D. tive health prosecu- tional
Reprod. 576 (N.D. clinic tors challenge
Health v. Ohio), through- to parental
Rosen rev'd sub out the notifica-
nom. Ohio state of tion by
v. Akron Ohio physicians






Vargas v. 634 F. 1986 All quali- All district Defendant
Calabrese Supp. 910 fled black board class certi-




City who City on
were re- June 11,
148 [Vol. 88:1
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff/ Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
Classr Class









Mechigian 612 F. 1985 Purchaser "[A]ll Brought
v. Art Supp. of original former as a secu-
Capital 1421 artwork and pre- rities case;
Corp. (S.D.N.Y. sent inves- claims







Green v. 615 F. 1985 Judgment Alabama's Dismissed
Harbin Supp. 719 debtor circuit and as to some
(N.D. district defen-











In re Con- 105 1985 Investors Three Securities
sumers F.R.D. who pur- classes of case
Power Co. 583 (E.D. chased under-
Sec. Litig. Mich.) common writers
stock in (approxi-
Consum- mately
ers Power 300 total)
Company
Rodriquez No. 80 C 1984 Appli- 27 Illinois Due proc-
v. Twp. of 1509, cants for townships ess claim
DeKalb 1984 U.S. welfare in related to
Dist. DeKalb receiving
LEXIS and Joliet general
2010] 149
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Akerman 609 F. 1984 Investors All un- Securities
v. Oryx Supp. 363 in Oryx derwriters case
Commc'n (S.D.N.Y. Commu- of Oryx




Harris v. 593 F. 1984 All black All offi- Alleged
Graddick Supp. 128 citizens of cials re- that state
(M.D. Alabama sponsible appointed
Ala.) for the dispropor-
appoint- tionately
ment of too few
poll offi- black








Nw. Nat'l 102 1984 Banks All part- Alleged
Bank of F.R.D. making ners in misrepre-
Minnea- 507 loans to auditing sentations
polis v. (S.D.N.Y. Saxon firm Fox about





In re Vic- 102 1984 Purchas- Securities Securities
tor Techs. F.R.D. 53 ers of under- case






Klein v. 587 F. 1984 Individual "[M]anufa Defendant
Council of Supp. 213 exposed to cturers, class not
Chem. (E.D. Pa.) chemical distribu- certified
Ass'ns used in tors, and
150 [Vol. 88:1
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In re For- No. C 83- 1984 Investors Under- Securities
tune Sys. 3348(A), in Fortune writers of case






O'Connell 35 B.R. 1983 Chapter "[I]ndividu Bank-
v. David 146 (E.D. 13 trustee als or busi- ruptcy
Pa.), affd, ness enti- action
740 F.2d ties not740 F.2d licensed to
practice











Coleman 98 F.R.D. 1983 Illinois All Illi- Due proc-
v. 638 (N.D. Taxpayers nois coun- ess and
McLaren Ill.) ties other equal
2010] 151
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Cayuga 565 F. 1983 Cuyaga "[A]II Land
Indian Supp. Indian other per- rights case
Nation of 1297 Nation sons who
N.Y. v. (N.D.N.Y. assert an
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Wiggins 743 1987 Corpora- The roy- Seeking
v. Enserch S.W.2d tion and alty inter- declara-
Explora- 332 (Tex. company est owners tory
tion, Inc. Ct. App.) in the judgment
Opelika on mean-




















































Gellantly 534 P.2d 1975 Washing- Six WA Class not
v. Chelan 1027 ton tax- counties certified,
Cnty. (Wash.) payers and their challeng-
officers ing levy
2010] 153
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State ex 515 1998 Individu- Insurance Dis-
rel. Erie S.E.2d als who companies missed, no
Fire Ins. 351 (W. signed in West juridicial
Co. v. Va.) releases Virginia links



























































Dayton 555 1990 Health Protestors Seeking
Women's N.E.2d clinic of clinic permanent
Health 956 offering injunction
Ctr. v. (Ohio) abortion and dam-
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Carlson v. 370 1985 Female "[AIll Alleged
Indep. N.W.2d teachers school discrimi-
Sch. Dist. 51 (Minn. who have districts in nation by
No. 283 Ct. App.) been de- Minnesota denying
nied use who are or the use of
of accu- were the sick pay
mulated employer for preg-
sick leave of the nancy and
during plaintiff child-birth






Excelsior 18 S.W.3d 2000 City and Timeshar- Suit to
Springs v. 53 (Mo. redevel- ers in a eliminate




State ex 672 1984 State of Members Seeking
rel. Ash- S.W.2d 99 Missouri of Kansas civil rem-
croft v. (Mo. Ct. City Fire- edy for
Kansas App.) fighters damages
City Fire- Local No. against a
fighters 42. (ap- labor un-
Local No. proxi- ion to
42 mately redress a









Exxon 470 A.2d 1983 Exxon "[A]ll Tax court,
Corp. v. 5 (N.J. taxing related to
East Super. Ct. jurisdic- taxing on
Bruns- App. Div.) tions storage
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Leon N. No. 8938, 1988 Corporate 203 lot Class not
Weiner & 1988 Del. lot owner owners of certified,
Assocs., Ch. North seeking a
Inc. v. LEXIS 8 Hills Sub- declara-
Krapf (Del. Ch.) division, tory
156 [Vol. 88:1
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Regal 894 A.2d 2006 Regal Notehold- Dispute
Entm't 1104 (Del. Enter- ers (ap- over
Grp. v. Ch.) tainment proxi- method
Amaranth Group, the mately 90 for calcu-
LLC issuer of a persons), lating the
series of repre- number of
converti- sented by shares of
ble notes hedge common
fund stock
Glosser v. No. 1995 Investors Under- Securities





In re 66 B.R. 1986 Debtor Investor- To deter-
Broadhol- 1005 (Broad- creditors mine
low Fund- (Bankr. hollow of the ownership
ing Corp. E.D.N.Y.) Funding brokerage
Corp) business
Funliner 873 So. 2d 2003 All per- Two Class not
of Ala., 198 (Ala.) sons who classes: certified
LLC v. played the (1) owners
Pickard video of arcades
gaming in which
machines there are
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Kadish v. 747 P.2d 1987 Arizona "All pre- Seeking
Ariz. State 1183 taxpayers sent and declara-
Land (Ariz.) future tory
Dep't mineral judgment





In re De- 298 B.R. 2003 Plan ad- All cur- Bank-
hon, Inc. 206 ministra- rent and ruptcy
(Bankr. D. tor former proceed-
Mass.) direct or ings to
indirect subordi-










In re 128 B.R. 1991 Insurance Wisconsin Certifica-
Rusty 1001 company auto rust- tion de-
Jones, Inc. (Bankr. proofing nied for










In re Car- 105 B.R. 1989 Debtors "[A]ll Certified
dinal In- 834 persons defendant
dus., Inc. (Bankr. and enti- class for
S.D. ties who the sole
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Mojica v. 363 F. 1973 Debtors Creditors Dis-
Automatic Supp. 143 missed;













Samuel v. 56 F.R.D. 1972 Two fe- 21 named Challeng-
Univ. of 435 (W.D. male University ing finan-
Pittsburgh Pa.) graduate defen- cial aid
students dants plus rulings
all other when








Hodgson 349 F. 1972 United Ohio Related to
v. Hamil- Supp. States courts, OH law
ton Mun. 1125 Depart- *udges, on gar-
2010] 159
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff / Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
Class Class
Court (S.D. ment of and clerks nishment
Ohio) Labor of court
Smith v. No. C 75- 1976 Black All em- Alleged
United 177, 1976 citizens ployers discrimi-
Bhd. of U.S. Dist. who were and/or natory
Carpen- LEXIS denied contrac- employ-
ters and 15980 employ- tors within ment prac-
Joiners of (N.D. ment op- the territo- tices
Am. Ohio) portunities rial juris-




In re 385 F. 1974 Patent Compa- Certifica-
Bourns Supp. owner nies ac- tion not




Pennsyl- 469 F. 1978 "[M]inorit Local Employ-
vania v. Supp. 329 y workers union, ment dis-
Local (E.D. Pa.) involved 1400 con- crimina-
Union in or de- struction tion suit
542, Int'l siring contrac-
Union of admit- tors and
Operating tance to employers













In re the 79 F.R.D. 1978 Investors Under- 13 cases
Gap 283 (N.D. writers in
Stores Cal.) multidis-
Sec. Litig. trict secu-
rities liti-
gation
Institu- 78 F.R.D. 1978 Institu- "[D]irecto Class
160 [Vol. 88:1
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
tionalized 413 (E.D. tionalized rs of all certified
Juveniles Pa.) juveniles mental
v. Sec'y in Penn- health and
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Mashpee 427 F. 1977 Mashpee Landown- Property
Tribe v. Supp. 899 Tribe ers in the rights
New Se- (D. Mass.) town of
abury Mashpee
Corp. II
Continen- No. 80 C 1980 Debtors Creditors After
tal Ill. 2642, bank-
Nat'l 1980 U.S. ruptcy
Bank v. Dist. proceed-
Mohr & LEXIS ings
Sons 13040
(N.D. Ill.)
March- 83 F.R.D. 1979 Women Named Class
winski v. 606 (W.D. cleaning defen- certifica-
Oliver Pa.) personnel dants plus tion de-
Tyrone owners nied; Title
Corp. through- VII claim









Payton v. 83 F.R.D. 1979 All All com- Defendant
Abbott 382 (D. women panies that class certi-
Labs Mass.) exposed in manufac- fication





Lynch 82 F.R.D. 1979 Lynch MII share- Defendant
Corp. v. 478 Corpora- holders of class certi-




Missis- 490 F. 1979 State of U.S. and Pre-
sippi v. Supp. 569 Missis- all black clearance
United (D.D.C.) sippi citizens for statu-
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Marcera 91 F.R.D. 1981 Detainees The sher- Defendant
v. Chin- 579 held in iffs in class certi-
lund (W.D.N.Y county charge of fled.


























































In re Itel 89 F.R.D. 1981 Purchas- Under- Securities
Sec. Litig. 104 (N.D. ers of writers case
Cal.) securities
Stewart v. 87 F.R.D. 1980 All county MS sher- Classes
Winter 760 (N.D. jail pris- iffs, not certi-
Miss.) oners boards of fied
statewide supervi- _I
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff / Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
Class Class




McFar- 96 F.R.D. 1982 Purchas- Under- Securities






in re Ar- 93 F.R.D. 1982 Franchisor All fran- Refused to
thur 590 (E.D. chisees certify















Doss v. 93 F.R.D. 1981 "[A]ll State Challeng-
Long 112 (N.D. those who judges ing fee
Ga.) are now or (1,000+) system of
will in the paying
future be judges by
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff/ Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
IClass Class
Diamond 476 U.S. 1986 Physicians State's Challeng-
v. Charles 54 who per- Attorneys ing abor-





Bank of 470 F.3d 2006 Bank of Em- To settle
N.Y. v. 264 (6th New York ployee- claims
Janowick Cir.) claimants
of stock
Robinson 387 F.3d 2004 Car buy- Texas car Class not




S. Ute 151 F.3d 1998 Ute Indian All per- Resolve
Indian 1251 Tribe sons, ex- ownership
Tribe v. (10th Cir.) cept the of coalbed










Socialist 145 F.3d 1998 Socialist All sixty- Constitu-
Workers 1240 Workers seven tional





Consol. 47 F.3d 1995 Interstate Assessing Alleging
Rail Corp. 473 (2d railroad, jurisdic- violations
v. Hyde Cir.) Conrail tions and of the
Park taxing Railroad
districts Revitali-





League of 999 F.2d 1993 Voters Texas Voting
2010] 165
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff / Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
Class Class
United 831 (5th and citi- officials Rights Act
Latin Am. Cir.) zens' responsi-
Citizens, league ble for
Council enforcing
No. 4434 a statute
V.
Clements
Bachelier No. 90- 1991 Planned Abortion Seek to
v. Hamil- 3725, Parent- protestors enjoin
ton Cnty., 1991 U.S. hood outside class from




Real Es- No. 05- 2007 Patent Realtors Class
tate Alli- cv-3573, holder accused of certifica-
ance, Ltd. 2007 U.S. patent tion de-




Albrecht No. 2007 Next of "[A]lI Class
v. Treon 1:06cv274 kin of county certified



















Moffat v. No. 04 C 2006 Individu- "UniCare Class not
Unicare 5685, als insured Defen- certified
Midwest 2006 U.S. under dants and
Plan Grp. Dist. UniCare ERISA
314541 LEXIS Midwest Plans that I
166 [Vol. 88:1
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Iowa No. 4:04- 2005 Trade Under- Dis-
Ass'n of cv-40270, associa- writers missed,
Bus. & 2005 U.S. tion claim was








Aid for 327 F. 2004 Health All Kan- Seeking
Women v. Supp. 2d care work- sas county declara-
Foulston 1273 (D. ers and dis- tory





Doe v. 216 2003 Sex of- All county Constitu-
Miller F.R.D. fenders attorneys tional
462 (S.D. currently in Iowa challenge
Iowa) living in to Iowa
Iowa statute
Forbes v. 71 F. 1999 Arizona All Constitu-
Woods Supp. 2d physicians County tional
1015 (D. Attorneys challenge
2010] 167
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff / Defen- Notes
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Class Class






Sebo v. 188 1999 Patients Urologists Conspir-
Ruben- F.R.D. and share- acy
stein 310 (N.D. holders
Ill.) 1
N.C. No. 5:96- 1998 Political District Certifica-
Right To CV-835- organiza- attorneys tion de-
Life, Inc. BO(1), tions and from all nied





In re 912 F. 1995 "All per- All per- Securities
Chambers Supp. 822 sons who sons who case
Dev. Sec. (W.D. purchased are or














In re Mar- No. 92- 1994 Purchas- Under- Securities
ion Mer- 0609-CV- ers of writers case
rell Dow W-6, 1994 securities





Deloitte 148 1993 Deloitte All mem- Contrac-
Noraudit F.R.D. Noraudit ber firms tual case
A/S v. 523 of Deloitte after
168 [Vol. 88:1
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
Class Class
Deloitte (S.D.N.Y. Haskins & merger








Endo v. 147 1993 Stock Under- Securities
Albertine F.R.D. purchasers writers case
164 (N.D.
Ill.)
Resolu- No. 92- 1992 Resolu- All per- Suit alleg-
tion Trust 1373, tion Trust sons who ing
Corp. v. 1992 U.S. Corpora- were part- wrongful
KMPG Dist. tion ners of prepara-
Peat LEXIS either tion of
Marwick 16670 Main financial







In re 875 F. 1994 Equitable Coopers Fraudu-
Phar-Mor, Supp. 277 Life As- & Ly- lent finan-
Inc. Sec. (W.D. surance brand cial activi-
Litig. Pa.) Society, et partners ties
al and prin-
cipals
Pabst 161 F.3d 1998 Pabst Retirees Declara-
Brewing 434 (7th Brewing tory





Dale 53 F.R.D. 1971 Electron- Electron- Patent
Elecs., 531 ics busi- ics corpo- infringe-




LaMar v. 489 F.2d 1973 Customers All the Certifica-
H&B 461 (9th of pawn pawn tion de-
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff / Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
Class Class
Novelty & Cir.) brokers in brokers nied






In re 973 F.2d 1992 Catawba Occupants Certifica-
Catawba 1133 (4th Indian and hold- tion de-
Indian Cir.) Tribe ers of nied,
Tribe Of disputed sought




















































Weiner v. 358 F. 1973 Customers Named Motion
Bank of Supp. 684 and/or banks plus dismissed
King of (E.D. Pa.) borrowers all other
170 [Vol. 88: 1
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C as d x be Y.D e en ar t C a s c i n
Case Cite Year Plaintiff / Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
Class Cl ass&






Coniglio 60 F.R.D. 1972 All per- All NFL Defendant
v. High- 359 sons who teams class not
wood (W.D.N.Y held sea- which certified
Servs., .) son tickets require






by defen- games as




Ross v. 69 So.2d 1954 Individual All mem- Seeking
Gerung 650 (Fla.) who made bers of damages





O'Connell 35 B.R. 1983 Bank- "[I]ndivid Unauthor-
v. David 141 ruptcy uals and ized prac-
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March- 81 F.R.D. 1979 Female "[Tihirty Certifica-
winski v. 487 (W.D. employees to fifty tion not
Oliver Pa.) employers allowed
Tyrone in the City on Title
Corp. of Pitts- VII claims
burgh who as matter





Research 301 F. 1969 Holder of Over 400 Patent
Corp. v. Supp. 497 patent seed corn infringe-





In re Ho- 500 F.2d 1974 Hotel Hotels Class not
tel Tel. 86 (9th guests (hun- certified
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Pipkorn v. 101 1960 Resident Benefici- Concern-
Village of N.W.2d aries of a ing illegal
Brown 623 (Wis.) water trust transfer of
Deer water trust
Mgmt. 52 F.R.D. 1971 Operator Football Antitrust
Television 162 (E.D. of closed clubs who suit. De-
Sys., Inc. Pa.) circuit are mem- fendant




Kline v. 508 F.2d 1974 Residen- All real Class not
Coldwell, 226 (9th tial home estate certified














Danforth 351 F. 1972 Attorney "[A]ll Seeking
v. Chris- Supp. 287 General of officers declara-
tian (W.D. Missouri and other tory
Mo.) officials judgment














Mudd v. 68 F.R.D. 1975 Criminal All judi- Defense
1732010]
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff / Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
Class Class
Busse 522 (N.D. pre-trial cial offi- class not
Ind.) detainees cers in certified
Indiana
Washing- 263 F. 1966 Current or Wardens, Challeng-
ton v. Lee Supp. 327 former jailers and ing racial
(M.D. prisoners sheriffs in segrega-
Ala.) of Ala- the State tion of







Turpeau 936 F. 1996 Borrowers Lenders Defendant
v. Fid. Supp. 975 and life and life class not
Fin. (N.D. Ga.) insurance insurers certified
Servs., insureds
Inc.
City of 402 1966 City of Property Class not
Lebanon S.W.2d Lebanon owners of certified,
v. Holman 832 (Mo. land in seeking to
Ct. App.) dispute annex
land
City of St. 299 1957 City of St. Property Annexa-
Ann v. S.W.2d Ann owners of tion case
Buschard 546 (Mo. land in
Ct. App.) dispute
Kane v. 369 F. 1973 Married All mem- Challeng-
Fortson Supp. women bers of ing law
1342 who are Boards of that denies
(N.D. Ga.) affected Registrars married
by law in through- women in













Adashu- 626 F.2d 1980 School State and Classes
174 [Vol. 88: 1
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Appendix Table 1. Defendn ls Atns
Case Cite Year Plaintiff / Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
Class Class
nas v. 600 (7th children local not certi-










Osborn v. 94 F.R.D. 1981 All per- All serv- Anti-trust
Pa.-Del. 23 (D. sons resid- ice station
Serv. Del.) ing in members
Station Delaware of the
















United 71 F.R.D. 1975 United Truckee Water











Contract 48 F.R.D. 1969 Minority Home Defendant
Buyers 7 (N.D. buyers of sellers and class not
League v. Ill.) houses mortgage certified,
F & F Inv. under land lenders alleged
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Benzoni 54 F.R.D. 1972 Buyers of There are Securities
v. Greve 450 shares in three ac- case
(S.D.N.Y. Sequoyah tions in
) Industries this case:I)Ben-
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Tucker v. 410 F. 1976 Indigent Mayors Challeng-
City of Supp. 494 prisoners and re- ing consti-
Mont- (M.D. corders tutionality
gomery Ala.) through- of the
Bd. of out the practice
















Guarantee 57 F.R.D. 1972 Buyers of Under- Securities







Hopson v. 418 F. 1976 All indi- All town- Certifica-
Schilling Supp. gent per- ship trus- tion of
1223 sons in the tees in the defendant
(N.D. state state that class of







Ragsdale 625 F. 1985 Physi- State's Challeng-
v. Supp. cians attorneys ing state
Turnock 1212 perform- for all of law
(N.D. Ill.) ing or the coun-
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff / Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
Class Class







Endo v. 147 1993 Stock Under- Defen-
Albertine F.R.D. purchas- writers dant class
164 (N.D. ers certified









Ruocco v. 380 F. 1974 All real All clerks Bilateral
Brinker Supp. 432 property of the class ac-
(S.D. Fla.) owners in judicial tion is
the State circuits in granted.
of Florida the State Plaintiff
whose of Florida and de-
real prop- fendant
erty has classes










Dudley v. 57 F.R.D. 1972 Receiver All pre- Case may
Se. Factor 177 (N.D. for the sent and proceed
& Fin. Ga.) Insurance former as a class
Corp. Investors share- action;
Trust holders of defendant
Company SEFAF class cer-
who re- tified.
180 [Vol. 88: 1
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Case Cite Year Plaintiff / Defen- Notes
Plaintiff dant
Class Class
ceived
preferred
shares of
stock in
Atlantic
Services

